Michigan's Plan: Target Date Investment Strategy

I stand corrected.

A representative of the Michigan Funeral Directors Association advises that their request for proposal for a new investment advisor for the master trust has resulted in the selection of a firm that will not only assume a true fiduciary relationship to funeral directors and consumers, but that will also guide the Association towards a target date investment strategy. Such an investment strategy would represent a true demarcation from the approach I was so critical of in a March post about the Michigan RFP.

Too often, the fiduciary's approach to preneed investment has been to offer three investment options to the funeral director. The fiduciary may even allow the funeral director to choose an asset allocation among the investment options. Little regard is given to the experience and sophistication the funeral director possesses with regard to financial and investment considerations. While Michigan law imposes a separate investment standard on non-guaranteed contracts, that is not the case in most states. Consequently, the two types of contracts are typically pooled in the same trust, and invested similarly. This presents a problem for the funeral directors that either take chances with the market or are ultra conservative. Another flawed investment approach is to allow income reporting to be the exclusive consideration.

Corporate fiduciaries have struggled with the delegation of investment responsibilities of the preneed trust. The uniform trust code contemplates the delegation of the investment responsibilities, and may even require such when the fiduciary lacks the expertise to properly invest the trust. But, it is virtually impossible to transfer the liability of that delegation. Applicable statutes contemplate notice and consent of the trust beneficiaries. The investment risk lies with the consumer who has purchased a non-guaranteed contract. With guaranteed contracts, the investment risk is assumed primarily by the funeral director. However, that risk is shifted to the consumer if the contract is 're-written' when the purchaser's survivors select a different arrangement at the time of need. The investment risk is also transferred when the funeral home goes out of business and the preneed contracts are not assumed by a successor entity.

Depending upon the factors incorporated by the investment strategy, the target date plan can provide a better model for the death care industry.

Illinois Tax Blues: when a loss is not a loss

For many Illinois funeral homes, April 15th served as a bitter reminder of Merrill Lynch and the financial losses suffered by the IFDA master trust. The final Merrill Lynch settlements (approximately $41 million) were received in 2012, and taxes had to be paid on those funds this past tax day. Funeral directors have questioned how those settlement payments could be taxed as income after the losses suffered when Merrill Lynch (as trustee) terminated the key man policies sold to the trust by a Merrill Lynch investment broker. After all, the aggregate settlement payments ($59 million) did not come close to covering the write downs taken by the trust ($76 million). But, Merrill Lynch took the position that a write down in a funeral home’s trust value for policy surrenders did not represent an investment loss. To compound the situation, Merrill Lynch filed a final Form 1041qft for each funeral home that transferred out of the master trust and treated the trust as terminated.

The question is whether Merrill Lynch could have characterized the value write downs so as to afford the funeral homes a capital loss carry over that could be applied to the settlement payments and future income. If one assumes the lowest Form 1041qft tax rate of 15%, Merrill Lynch could have saved the IFDA master trust participants income taxes of approximately $11.5 million.

With Merrill Lynch now out of the IFDA picture, funeral homes may want to turn to the IFDA’s new trustee for assistance. If the write downs can be properly characterized as losses that can be used as capital loss carryovers, it may be worthwhile to have those ‘final’ 1041QFT returns amended. As fiduciary of the Wisconsin Master Trust, the IFDA trustee may have already contemplated this issue.
 

Wisconsin Cemeteries: Who needs a fiduciary?

Here is proof that readership of newspapers is going down.

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel called a few weeks back about a Wisconsin legislative bill that sought investment freedom for cemetery trust funds.  With the legislative battle that was waged a year ago in Wisconsin, we had expected the bill might represent a renewed effort to allow common ownership of funeral homes and cemeteries.  But instead, five Wisconsin legislators are sponsoring a proposal that would allow Wisconsin cemeteries to bypass fiduciary institutions and allow their trust funds to be administered by broker-dealers. The lead sponsor commented to the newspaper reporter that “It’s really not a big deal. Cemeteries are already investing with these folks.”  The sponsor indicated that he introduced the bill at the request of a stockbroker who had been investing a cemetery’s funds for years without knowing he had been doing so illegally.      

Death care operators should take note that the duties of the “fund manager” differ as between a broker-dealer and a registered investment advisor (RIA).  As explained in the SEC’s 2011 “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers”, while the RIA has a fiduciary duty to know his client, the broker-dealer does not have such a relationship unless the circumstances dictate otherwise.  The broker-dealer is only required to make recommendations consistent with the customer’s interests.  Ask any RIA if the difference is important.  But, the Wisconsin cemetery bill underscores the duty that is missing from both RIAs and broker-dealers: the duty to comply with the laws applicable to the client’s trust fund. 

The OCC made this duty known to federally chartered preneed trustees more than 10 years ago.  But, a broker-dealer has no duty to stay up on Wisconsin’s Chapter 157.  It makes you wonder whether the sponsors of Assembly Bill 79 were staying up with the troubles of the Wisconsin Master Trust. 

But then again, that trust did have a fiduciary.    

  

 

Missouri's First Preneed Regulation: if at first you don't succeed, try, try again

More than one funeral director has expressed the opinion that the State Board should never have been given rule making authority. We'll never know, but if the State Board had rulemaking authority 22 years ago, it could have implemented rules to help enforce NPS' 1990 settlement agreement, and thereby avoided that company's collapse. But equally important, rule making authority provides the State Board the means to clarify the ambiguities and gaps that exist in Senate Bill. No 1. This is as much to assist the preneed seller who has a business practice that does not fall neatly within the law as it does the State Board attempting to address how that practice should be regulated.

But, Missouri's first attempt to pass a 'conventional' preneed regulation has been a trying exercise for the State Board, its staff and the industry, with mutual frustrations getting the better of everyone. All concerned may have been spoiled by the level of cooperation exhibited when emergency regulations were needed to keep Missouri's preneed industry operating. Had it not been for those emergency regulations, Missouri's preneed industry would have come to a screeching halt for months.

Following the passage of the emergency rules, the State Board staff recommended that the industry's other SB1 complaints be tabled to provide the financial examination process the time required for Division personnel to 'get their arms around the issues". That made perfect sense to this author, that is until the insurance assignment became the focal point for the Board's first regulation.

The political realities are that the State of Missouri needs revenues, and the excess insurance proceeds paid to funeral homes should be paid to the State pursuant to RSMo 208.010.7(4) before refunded to the families of assistance recipients. If funeral homes use the spend down provisions to their benefit when meeting with families, then they should also have a duty to comply with Chapter 208. But, the problem has been that families were allowed to exclude insurance policies for asset testing without a preneed contract, and the drafters of SB1 were focused on NPS and the sale of preneed contracts.

SB1 has flaws, and the Division once acknowledged that corrective legislation would eventually be needed. Our question is whether the Board's first regulation is indication that the State now has a double standard when it comes to preneed regulations and the need for corrective legislation: a restrictive interpretation of SB1 for the industry and a liberal interpretation for itself?

Like SB1, the Board's first regulation proposal was forced by the State, and has its own flaws. The proposal is too broad in attempting to define all insurance assignments and beneficiary designations as the consideration that triggers SB1. The proposal also extends the preneed contract fee without an explanation of the examination procedures needed for the transaction. Then to buttress the position that the regulation binds all outstanding insurance assignments, the State relies upon a confidential legal memorandum as having put the industry on notice. If the industry does not find the State's rationale credible, many funeral homes may refuse to comply. We find it frustrating that the State could accomplish most of what it wants without sacrificing credibility. That credibility will be important to getting funeral homes to embrace the future changes required for compliance with SB1. It remains to be seen whether the State will be flexible with the industry in achieving their mutual goals.

The Trappist's Caskets: Does anyone's preneed law apply?

The monks of St. Joseph Abbey received good news in their battle to sell caskets when a Federal appeals court affirmed a lower court’s decision that struck down a Louisiana law that would have required the monks to either open a licensed funeral home or get a funeral director’s license. The District Court held that the restriction on casket sales amounted to a brand of economic protectionism that was not a legitimate state interest. The Court of Appeals applies a test that we find relevant to current controversies in Missouri and Kansas, but for this blog post we want to question whether the opinion would have been different if court had been asked to review the application of a preneed law to the preneed sale of Trappist caskets.

The purpose for preneed laws, protecting consumer payments until delivery is made, would seem to be equally applicable to funeral homes, cemeteries, casket stores, monument vendors or Trappist monks. However, most state preneed laws were written when the death care industry did not have significant competition for casket, vault and marker sales. Consequently, preneed laws are directed at death care licensees, and the occasional examiner or auditor will not be checking on the casket store to determine its compliance with the preneed law. If the casket store is making preneed sales, and marketing to out of state residents, multiple preneed laws could be implicated. The casket store’s website may reflect whether it offers deferred delivery. One of the Trappist’s websites offered the following:

Advance Arrangements

Peace of Mind for You and Your Family

Selecting a casket prior to need is a gift you can give your family. This arrangement ensures your wishes are met by securing your choice of casket for future use. By purchasing your casket in advance of need, you are relieving loved ones from making this often difficult decision, while closing your life's story on your own terms.

Purchase at Today's Prices Now, Ship When Needed

A pre-need arrangement with the Trappist monks of New Melleray Abbey allows you to purchase in advance, and have it shipped to the destination desired by your family at the appropriate time. You can rest assured the casket that you ordered will be available for immediate shipment when the time of need arrives.

We at Trappist Caskets feel very blessed to be able to so humbly provide these caskets, made with the work of our hands and with prayer in our hearts, to bring some small measure of comfort and solace to families in their times of need.

I hesitated to post on this issue because I love the Trappist’s ale so much, but preneed regulators need to be uniform and consistent.
 

Did Someone Ask "Who's the Boss?"

Three years ago we asked that question with regard to the power struggle occurring between the Missouri State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors and the Missouri Division of Professional Registration staff. That post was influenced by our experiences with preneed regulators from other states, who range from elected politicians to the revolving door bureaucrat. I would always prefer the experience and stability of a Dennis Britson or a Mack Smith, but they honed their skills over decades, and Missouri is under a bit of pressure to get reform rolling. With the Missouri Legislature having vested preneed supervision with the industry, we saw hope that Missouri could establish a unique structure where the experience of the industry would mesh with a staff with long term commitments. But silly me; the regulations drafted in response to a December vote on insurance assignments provide the answer to “Who is the Boss?” It is the Governor.

I must confess that my mind drifts at times when I attend the State Board meetings. Okay, I also check emails from time to time when the Executive Director gives her reports. But, the regulation proposals leave me wondering whether I was in the wrong room last December. But, Mr. Otto did whisper to me from time to time during the meeting I thought was the State Board’s. Maybe we were at a MFDEA meeting? Then again, I recall a unanimous vote that defined the insurance assignment as a preneed contract that was to be exempt from the $36 fee.

My warning from the “Who is the Boss” post in 2010 was this:

Death care operators are often frustrated when regulators take actions that demonstrate a lack of understanding of the business (or worse yet, a misunderstanding of applicable laws). The risk to both the death care operator and consumer is when the elected preneed regulator allows politics to influence the reform process. Elected regulators may pose the greatest challenge to developing effective preneed supervision, and then maintaining that system.

It is obvious the Governor doesn’t read this blog. Since 2010, an elected politician has made insurance assignments our preneed reform priority. I get it. The excess insurance proceeds could help offset the benefits paid to nursing homes, and Chapter 208 requires a Chapter 436 preneed contract. The State doesn’t want to revisit Chapter 436. It would be easier to manipulate the language of SB1 to get the desired result. (It’s not like the industry doesn’t do it too.) It took the State Board 18 months to offer a compromise, and one that was a win-win for the state and the industry. But, you are overplaying this hand by demanding the $36 per contract fee.

For the past two years, the industry and Board members have asked what the Division really needs in terms of fees to conduct exams. The answers have been evasive at best, but I could defend that response because the examination procedures are work in progress. But, your regulation proposals indicate that “The costs for the Board to administer preneed contracts is the same per contract, regardless of the value of the preneed contract.” If that is the case, then what is the cost per contract to perform a preneed examination? I find the Division’s budget for the State Board confusing, but the numbers attached to the agenda are significant. Is the Division receiving more that it needs, and if so, where do those funds go?

Up to this point, the examination procedures have focused on recordkeeping and confirming that consumer funds were deposited to banks and insurance companies. At some later date those procedures will need to look at how those funds are administered and paid out to funeral homes. But, until then, why is the $36 fee required on a transaction where the funeral director does not receive funds until after a death has occurred?

Three years ago I defended the slow pace of the Division, and advised the industry that reform required a shared responsibility between the Division and the State Board.  Accordingly, please respect the Legislature and let the State Board perform its role for reform under SB1.
 

Obama's Plan to Tax the Rich: death care trusts

They say that the devil is in the details, and that is proving true for the Obama definition of the “rich” (those families that earn more than $250,000) and the plan to fix the budget. The IRS provided some detail to the Obama plan last December when it published a proposed regulation that would increase the Medicare tax to 3.8% and impose the tax on the rich through their trusts and estates. The NFDA and ICCFA have been trying to get their respective members’ attention because the proposed regulation specifically includes their business trusts as ‘rich’ that are be subject to the Medicare tax. 

Sometimes it may seem that associations cry wolf to reinforce to the membership the need for the association. But, the proposed IRS regulation is somewhat unique in that it specifically identifies Section 685 qualified funeral trusts and Section 642 endowed care trusts as those which will be subject to the Medicare Tax. As both associations point out in comments submitted to the IRS, the proposal reflects how little the Service understands the purposes of these trusts.

To see each association’s comments click the following hyperlinks:NFDA           ICCFA 

There is a legitimate risk to qualified funeral trusts that do not make individual account allocations for composite filings. We would have thought most fiduciaries prepared QFTs in such a manner, but the Service’s comments from a few years ago suggests otherwise. And, what about those preneed trusts that have not taken the Section 685 election?

Even though the Service’s rationale for application of tax to Section 642 endowed care trusts is tenuous, these trusts lack the individual accounting ‘out’ that can save the QFT.
 

An Investment Strategy: the Man without a Plan

If you haven’t noticed, there has been some turnover among the associations’ preneed fund managers. With the threat of additional litigation in Wisconsin, this trend could continue. But not all of the turnover has been as publicized as what we have seen in Illinois and Wisconsin. After 20 years at the helm, Merrill Lynch recently gave notice to the Michigan Funeral Directors Association of its resignation. There are no search protocols for preneed fund managers, and so Michigan borrowed from the retirement fund community by publishing a request for proposal (RFP). While the MFDA should be commended in their effort to bring transparency to their program’s asset management, they missed (or ignored) an opportunity to shift more investment responsibilities to the financial industry. Instead of using FINRA Rule 2111 (“know your client”) to their advantage, the MFDA structured the RFP to perpetuate (and extend) the funeral director’s controlling role in investment decisions.

Hidden investment charges have been ‘part of business’ in the death care industry for decades, and this author has contemplated whether ERISA’s fee disclosure requirements could ever be incorporated into preneed trusts by the Federal Trade Commission. The Michigan RFP focused on the same ERISA fee disclosure requirements, which could lead one to assume that association’s leaders did not want to make the same mistake again. The Michigan RFP also raised another ERISA concept worthy of the preneed industry’s consideration: the 401K approach to investment by individual contract. We too have wondered why larger programs have not looked at data from individual contracts and the sponsoring funeral homes to build an investment options matrix.

But, the Michigan RFP can be faulted for cutting off the diligence requirements of FINRA Rule 2111. To insulate the Association from solicitations, the RFP provided summary information about the program and required all inquiries to go through an ERISA consultant. Prospective fund managers were required to submit investment strategies on limited facts and without direct communications to the Association. It is understandable that the Association would want to narrow the field before initiating an exchange of confidential information with prospective managers, but the screening of candidates should have preceded the request for investment strategies. Subsequent to the screening, the MFDA should then have provided detailed information pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Under FINRA 2111, this sequence would have expanded the fund manager’s diligence responsibilities regarding investment strategy recommendations. The nature of the questions posed by the candidates would also have helped the MFDA in its assessment of the candidates. Instead, the RFP narrowed the fund manager’s diligence to an old investment strategy with a history of mixed results and challenges.

Within the context of ERISA retirement funds, RFPs may take a formula approach to finding a replacement fund manager. But the preneed industry is fragmented by 50 different state laws, and by program issues such as whether non-guaranteed contracts are sold, the association’s role as a seller versus an agent, investment restrictions, and trusting percentages. Injecting preneed asset management with a dose of ERISA could help to discourage hidden fees and improve the quality of fund managers, but the industry also needs an alternative to the strategy of offering funeral directors three investment options to choose from.
 

Master Trusts: Finding the Rails

Both the Memorial Business Journal and the Funeral Service Insider commented last week on the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s February 7th article regarding the former executive director of the Wisconsin Funeral Directors Association. Several issues were raised that should be included in future industry debate, and in particular, I would agree with Mr. Isard’s questions whether association executives are qualified to manage a master trust. But the following comments beg an immediate response:

“The whole situation with [the] Wisconsin Preneed Trust went off the rails when the goal shifted from trusting funds to investing funds.”

“The assumption that these trust funds are in the investment business is a mistake. We’re not. We’re in the trust business. From my view, that is a presumption of a preservation of principle. With a trust, you have an obligation to be prudent.”

Those comments suggest that trusting funds and investing funds are somehow mutually exclusive. While the comments may reflect the views of much of the death care industry, they also reflect a failure to understand the fiduciary’s duties. When entrusted with the money of another, the fiduciary has a duty to invest those funds consistent with the purposes of the trust and the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The fiduciary’s investment duties are governed by other laws, and a majority of our states have adopted the Prudent Investor Act. Wikipedia provides the following explanation of that Act:

In enacting the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, states should have repealed legal list statutes, which specified permissible investments types. (However, guardianship and conservatorship accounts generally remain limited by specific state law.) In those states which adopted part or all of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, investments must be chosen based on their suitability for each account's beneficiaries or, as appropriate, the customer. Although specific criteria for determining "suitability" does not exist, it is generally acknowledged, that the following items should be considered as they pertain to account beneficiaries:

• financial situation;
• current investment portfolio;
• need for income;
• tax status and bracket;
• investment objective; and
• risk tolerance.

The majority of preneed trusts involve a single seller/provider and guaranteed preneed contracts. Under such circumstances, the funeral home operator has assumed the investment risk when the preneed contract is performed as written. Fiduciaries (and fund managers) have viewed the operator as the account beneficiary for purposes of the Prudent Investor Act. But depending upon state law, and whether the contract is ‘re-written’ at the time of death, the preneed purchaser may bear the investment risk. Accordingly, the fiduciary and fund manager should not completely ignore the preneed purchaser as the account beneficiary for purposes of the Prudent Investor Act.

Neither fiduciaries nor fund managers want to bring the preneed purchaser into the Prudent Investor equation for obvious reasons. But are suitability of investments for two that dissimilar? We would suggest not if the objective is to have investment performance track the prearrangement’s purchase price increases. As we noted in a March 2010 post about the IFDA master trust, the purchaser of a non-guaranteed contract was unhappy because the return on her non-guaranteed contract (1.7%) did not keep pace with the price increases of her planned funeral (4.2%).

Determining who to include as an account beneficiary in the Prudent Investor equation only gets more complicated when the preneed trust is an association master trust with dozens, or hundreds, of funeral home operators. If the master trust includes a healthy percentage of non-guaranteed contracts, the number of account beneficiaries could swell to the thousands. If the association is not the preneed seller (as is the case in Missouri, but not Illinois), what interest does the association have in the trust so as to justify being considered an account beneficiary? There are arguments in support of the association being such a beneficiary, but can those interests ever outweigh the funeral operator and the non-guaranteed contract purchaser?

One could argue that the Wisconsin Master Trust was never fully on the rails. The Association determined early on that a depository account could not keep up with rising funeral costs. Rather than seek legislation that would clarify the trust’s investment authority, the Association leadership sought regulatory permission to allow the master trust to embark on the path of investment diversification. The program derailed only after the executive director enmeshed his personal objectives with those of the association and then conspired with the fund managers to treat the association as the master trust’s primary account beneficiary.
 

Too Literal of an Interpretation: Mississippi and Preneed Taxes

The Mississippi Secretary of State seems to be taking a very proactive approach to the regulation of preneed and perpetual care funds. Over the course of the last few years, the Regulation and Enforcement Division of the Secretary of State’s office has averaged an enforcement proceeding per month. We were curious what type of enforcement proceedings they were pursuing, and picked one at random. The luck of draw involved a situation where the Mississippi regulators alleged the preneed seller’s preneed contract form did not adequately disclose to the consumer the tax consequences of their preneed trust. While the preneed contract form stated that income taxes may be withheld by the trust, the seller’s trustee reported the income to the contract purchaser. This did not set well with the Mississippi regulators, particularly when the consumer had no right to cancel the contract and receive a refund of the trust income.

The Mississippi regulators are not alone in their perception of the inequities of this situation. Nebraska preneed regulators are also questioning why income should ever be reported to consumers when they may never receive it. The answer is that the Internal Revenue Service forced this issue with Rev. Rul. 87-127, with the goal of requiring a single method of income reporting for preneed trusts.

The Service struggled with the situation that troubles the Mississippi and Nebraska regulators: how can the purchaser be the grantor if he/she is never entitled to a refund of the income (or even trust deposits) upon the contract’s cancellation. But, as between the consumer and the funeral home, the funeral home’s right to the trust corpus is dependent upon performance of the contract. While the consumer may never receive a refund, he/she can choose a different funeral home to service the contract. The value of that service satisfies the grantor rules of the tax code, and supports the IRS’ conclusions in the Ruling.

The inequity of the situation may have led to the passage of IRC Section 685. Given an alternative is available to the seller, the Mississippi regulators sought to force the seller to either change its contract or require the trustee to change its income reporting. But in doing so, the Mississippi regulators misstate IRC Section 685. Irrevocability is not a key characteristic of an IRC Section 685 qualified funeral trust. While the Section 685 election is viewed as irrevocable, the irrevocability of the preneed contract has no impact on Section 685. The Mississippi regulators also fail to acknowledge that Section 685 is the trustee’s election to make, not the funeral home’s. While the two need to work in concert, it is the trustee that has ultimate control over the trust’s income reporting.