Missouri's 2012 Preneed Patch: But is the MO436-09 System Working?

Missouri’s preneed regulator, the State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, will meet June 2nd to continue its discussion of agenda for the upcoming legislative session. Due to the lead time required to formulate legislation, the State Board is forced to begin discussions before its 2011 legislative agenda (SB325) even becomes law on August 28th. With the examination process having only begun this past January, the State Board does not even have the basis to evaluate crucial provisions of Senate Bill No. 1. Accordingly, the State Board faces decisions about what its legislative goals should be for the next year.

For the June 2nd meeting (and its prior May 18th meeting), the State Board staff went back to the various legislative proposals made during the summer of 2010 as a starting point. The temptation of Board may be to go through those proposals and evaluate each one on its merits. But the better approach would be to evaluate each proposal in terms of need and consistency with the legislative intent for SB1.

For example, page 9 of the June 2nd agenda includes changes intended to take preneed trusting to 100%. The proposal was discussed on May 18th, put up for a vote, and then withdrawn for further discussion on June 2nd. While it would be worthwhile to have a discussion on the merits of the proposal (including how 100% trusting would benefit both the consumer and the industry), the more important questions are whether the proposal is needed, and whether it is consistent with the legislative intent of SB1.
 

Comptroller: It's Not My Call

For a brief period, the Illinois Comptroller posted a notice that sidestepped the inquiries made by funeral directors about the application of their Merrill Lynch settlements. The OIC website has since be revised.

One of the inquiries to the OIC may have involved whether the settlement funds could be applied to the litigation costs for pending lawsuits against Merrill Lynch. But for the litigation brought against Merrill Lynch, the funeral homes would not have received the settlements paid by the Department of Insurance. However, the settlement funds fall far short of the actual damages suffered by the funeral homes and consumers, and the argument may be that a portion of the funds could be used to continue the litigation.

Specifically, the Comptroller’s answered as follows:

It is the position of the OIC that we do not have the authority to instruct industry members on the proper disbursement of the funds.

In the following paragraph, the Comptroller warns:

During the review of future annual reports and audits, we will examine the method in which the funds are handled to assure that industry members acted in a good faith manner and in the best interest of consumers when determining the disposition of the funds.

While the litigation argument has merit, the Comptroller probably had concerns about the other uses funeral homes may have for the settlement funds. The notice may seem evasive to the industry, but it did not necessarily foreclose the application of funds to litigation that may benefit the consumer. But, funeral homes should pay heed to the warning that they will be held accountable for how settlement funds for active contracts are applied.
 

Preneed Fund Manager: Is your O&E coverage current?

Many state preneed regulators share the point of view that the payments made toward a preneed contract belong to the consumer until the prearranged funeral is provided. This perspective was adopted by the California Attorney General in its Eighth Cause of Action brought against the California Funeral Directors Association and its Master Trust. The AG criticizes the CFDA for investment decisions that are fairly representative of those taken by the industry as a whole.

Early on, the CMT relied upon bond funds that specialized in zero coupon government bonds. The AG points out that U.S. Treasury Bonds and similar bond funds outperformed the CMT at less risk and with lower fees.

When the bond market crashed in 2001, the CMT experienced substantial investment losses and changed investment course. The CMT began diversifying, and purchasing mortgaged back securities, foreign bonds and notes, corporate asset-backed securities and other types of securities. The AG criticizes these investments by stating “these types of investments are not insured bank accounts, are not bonds that are legal investments for commercial bank (sections 1001 et seq. of the Financial Code lists certain legal investments for commercial banks), are not government bonds, and do not comply with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (as discussed below).”

The AG goes on to argue that the investment policies of the CMT should be set by the risk and return objectives of the preneed contract beneficiaries, and faults the defendants for having set investment policies based on their own needs.

Other states’ preneed regulators (and cemetery regulators) share the California AG’s point of view. It is common to hear a regulator characterize the preneed trust as a depository account or to express the belief the industry would be better off if preneed funding were left to the insurance companies. These regulators need to take the blinders off.

The CMT, like so many preneed trusts, went into tax exempt investments after 1988 because of Revenue Rul. 87-127. The Internal Revenue Service pushed for an income reporting method that proved impractical and burdensome. To compound the situation, the IRS applied the ruling retroactively to certain states. California was one of those states. Prior to the ruling, funeral homes had no reason to require the consumer’s social security number when selling a preneed contract. Consequently, many California trustees could not comply with the ruling with regard to existing contracts.

The ruling required grantor statements to be sent to consumers, and the consumers complained. So, funeral homes instructed their preneed fiduciaries to go into anything that didn’t require a grantor statement. While the CMT went to zero coupon bonds, the IFDA went into the poorly conceived key man insurance. Other trusts went into annuities. Various approaches were taken because the IRS could not provide reporting guidance once it changed the rules.

In stating that the preneed funds must be invested pursuant to the contract beneficiary’s objectives, the California AG has ignored the fact that a majority of these preneed contracts are probably guaranteed. Under that arrangement, the funeral home has assumed the investment risk. From a practical approach, how would the investment advisor determine the objectives of the thousands of preneed beneficiaries? In a prior post, this blog reported about an Illinois contract beneficiary’s complaint about the IFDA Master Trust. In contrast to the losses suffered by the member funeral homes, the beneficiary experienced a modest return on her non-guaranteed contract. Her complaint was that the return was not enough to keep up with rising funeral costs.

The California AG argument that the CMT must comply with the Prudent Investor Rule in a way that does not expose trust principal to risk is the equivalent to handcuffing both of the investment advisor’s hands behind his back.

Of the investment complaints made by the California AG, the one which would seem to merit the most attention would be the relationship between the former investment advisor and a CFDA board member. That CFDA board member also served as a trustee for one of the advisor’s funds, for which he received compensation. That relationship warrants an inquiry whether the relationship was disclosed and the compensation appropriate and reasonable.

The AG’s argument that the investment advisor must be independent from the seller is one shared by Missouri regulators. The Missouri regulators are quick to point to the abuses committed by NPS and its investment management firm. (See our post titled “The Zeal for Independence”). Those abuses were so bad that the Missouri legislature passed a provision prohibiting a relationship between the seller and the fund manager. This author thought the provision went too far. (See our post titled “Regulating Out of Context”). With the passage of SB 325, the Missouri Funeral Directors Association has convinced the Missouri legislature that it did go too far.

Regardless of whether the fund manager is a fiduciary employee or an independent investment advisor, that fund manager should appropriately look to the preneed seller for input about investment objectives. For the larger trust, the fiduciary and fund manager should adopt a written investment policy that, among other factors, considers the trust’s mix of guaranteed and non-guaranteed contracts. If the fund manager is an independent investment advisor, the relationship should be documented with an agreement that discloses all forms of compensation. Consistent with the SEC efforts to reform mutual funds, the disclosure should address any 12b-1 fees. The agreement with the fiduciary should also disclose all relationships the investment advisor has with the preneed seller.

To the extent the preneed contract is guaranteed, the regulator needs to recognize the seller’s economic interest in the trust’s performance. But, fiduciaries and sellers need to consider the growing number of non-guaranteed contracts and the possibility that the guaranteed contract may be serviced by a different funeral home. While the seller may have the prevailing economic interest, not all of the trust may be considered his for investment purposes.

 

The Independent Preneed Trustee: In a Perfect World

A breakdown in communications between the CFDA and the Cemetery and Funeral Bureau has resulted in the California Attorney General filing a lawsuit that can be appropriately described as vitriolic. The “California lawsuit” could provide some valuable ‘what to avoid” lessons for regulators in other states.

In an unusual move, the Bureau went “public” last year by raising a number of issues with administration of the California Master Trust. Some of those issues did warrant an explanation. One issue involves the actions taken by the CFDA subsidiary in response to the 2000 market crash. The subsidiary implemented a plan to stabilize the master trust value after the collapse of a bond fund. Another issue regards the administration fees charged the master trust subsequent to the collapse of the bond fund. A third issue regards the subsidiary’s policy to pay a portion of the administration fees to participating funeral homes.

The CFDA countered with arguments of how its actions were within California law. Those arguments have merit, and were covered by this blog in July 2010. (See California Master Trust: serious missteps, but not another IFDA.) The CFDA proposed that the issues be reviewed in the context of relevant facts, having the Bureau apply thirty year old laws and regulations to the CMT’s circumstances. Instead, the California Attorney General adopted a “quick kill” strategy that employs a two prong attack: involve the consumer and apply the law strictly.

In taking the controversy to the consumer, the California AG has been disingenuous when using such terms as “conspiracy”, “concocted”, and “kickbacks”. In doing so, the AG may end up galvanizing the CMT membership, and getting anything but a quick kill.

The AG’s legal arguments are also somewhat disingenuous. As the title suggests, this blog entry will focus on the AG’s call for a truly independent trustee. In future entries, we will look at some of the AG’s other legal arguments.

In the “First Cause of Action” of the petition, the AG makes the argument for how the CFDA’s administrative subsidiary has assumed unlawful control over the preneed funeral trust. Granted, the CFDA may have gone too far in assuming control over the trustee’s appointment of agents (and discounted the interests of consumers with non-guaranteed contracts), but the AG ignores the fact the master trust consists of thousands of preneed contracts that originates in hundreds of funeral homes. This fact makes the fiduciary dependent upon the funeral home in a number of ways.

The trustee needs preneed contract data for accounting (much in the same way the regulator’s auditor is dependent on the same records to perform his job). As with other states’ master trusts, the association performed a vital role in providing crucial contract administration. Contrary to the AG’s citation to the California probate code, these are administrative functions the corporate fiduciary must delegate. The trustee cannot account for the preneed contract as a depository account.

The trustee also needs input when setting investment policies. The AG would suggest that the preneed trustee cannot look to the funeral home. This ignores that the vast majority of the preneed contracts are guaranteed, where the funeral home has assumed the risk of investment. It also flies in the face of the numerous “No Action Letters” issued by the Securities Exchange Commission.

The manner in which the trustee prepares trust tax returns impacts both the funeral home and consumer. The most efficient approach (Federal Form 1041QFT) has a cost to the funeral home. Consequently, the preneed fiduciary will want the funeral home’s approval.

The ‘independent preneed trustee’ may seem to be a quick and easy answer to regulators, but only if the courts ignore the facts and realities of administering a preneed trust.
 

SB340: Missouri's 2011 Preneed Patch

Continuing the theme that effective preneed regulation requires the occasional update, the Missouri legislature is poised to pass the first ‘patch’ to SB1, the 2009 legislation that ‘re-wrote’ Chapter 436. Senate Bill No. 340 will make four noteworthy changes to Chapter 436.

Concerned that preneed sellers would use variable annuities to fund preneed contracts, Missouri’s insurance regulators sought to have SB1 limit the use of annuities to the single premium variety. This proved burdensome to funeral homes committed to insurance funded preneed. The single premium requirement denied the funeral home the use of variable pay annuities for consumers who either do not qualify for life insurance, or who cannot afford the premium of a life insurance policy. SB340 appropriately allows variable pay annuities to be used to fund preneed contracts so long as death benefits are never less than the premiums paid.

While SB1 preserved the use of joint account funded preneed, small operators encountered problems with banks and the Patriot Act. SB340 will allow POD accounts to be used in funding preneed contracts.

SB1 provided for retroactive application in certain respects. But, with regard to preneed trusts in existence prior to August 28, 2009, SB1 provided for historic law treatment with regard to income distributions to sellers and the use of income to pay trust expenses. Section 436.031 authorized the distribution of trust income to the seller provided the mark to market requirement was satisfied. The section also obligated the seller to pay trust expenses and taxes because of trust income withdrawals. SB340 will delete that provision, and it isn’t clear the intent for this change.

Section 436.031 of the prior law also allowed a preneed seller to designate an investment advisor, and in doing so, relieve the trustee of all asset management responsibilities. This provision was exploited by NPS, and was pivotal in conversion of millions of dollars of preneed trusts to worthless insurance. Seeking a completely independent trustee, SB1 imposed restrictions on who could serve as an investment advisor to the trust. While the NPS experience proved the need to keep the fiduciary responsible for asset management, SB1 went too far in driving a wedge between the asset manager and the seller. SB340 will create an exception to that restriction for the “external” investment advisor who satisfies Section 436.440.