Death Care Law Blog : Kansas Death Care and Preneed Lawyer & Attorney : Stalter Legal Services Law Firm : Funeral Law, Elder Law : Kansas City

If you haven’t noticed, there has been some turnover among the associations’ preneed fund managers. With the threat of additional litigation in Wisconsin, this trend could continue. But not all of the turnover has been as publicized as what we have seen in Illinois and Wisconsin. After 20 years at the helm, Merrill Lynch recently gave notice to the Michigan Funeral Directors Association of its resignation. There are no search protocols for preneed fund managers, and so Michigan borrowed from the retirement fund community by publishing a request for proposal (RFP). While the MFDA should be commended in their effort to bring transparency to their program’s asset management, they missed (or ignored) an opportunity to shift more investment responsibilities to the financial industry. Instead of using FINRA Rule 2111 (“know your client”) to their advantage, the MFDA structured the RFP to perpetuate (and extend) the funeral director’s controlling role in investment decisions.

Hidden investment charges have been ‘part of business’ in the death care industry for decades, and this author has contemplated whether ERISA’s fee disclosure requirements could ever be incorporated into preneed trusts by the Federal Trade Commission. The Michigan RFP focused on the same ERISA fee disclosure requirements, which could lead one to assume that association’s leaders did not want to make the same mistake again. The Michigan RFP also raised another ERISA concept worthy of the preneed industry’s consideration: the 401K approach to investment by individual contract. We too have wondered why larger programs have not looked at data from individual contracts and the sponsoring funeral homes to build an investment options matrix.

But, the Michigan RFP can be faulted for cutting off the diligence requirements of FINRA Rule 2111. To insulate the Association from solicitations, the RFP provided summary information about the program and required all inquiries to go through an ERISA consultant. Prospective fund managers were required to submit investment strategies on limited facts and without direct communications to the Association. It is understandable that the Association would want to narrow the field before initiating an exchange of confidential information with prospective managers, but the screening of candidates should have preceded the request for investment strategies. Subsequent to the screening, the MFDA should then have provided detailed information pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Under FINRA 2111, this sequence would have expanded the fund manager’s diligence responsibilities regarding investment strategy recommendations. The nature of the questions posed by the candidates would also have helped the MFDA in its assessment of the candidates. Instead, the RFP narrowed the fund manager’s diligence to an old investment strategy with a history of mixed results and challenges.

Within the context of ERISA retirement funds, RFPs may take a formula approach to finding a replacement fund manager. But the preneed industry is fragmented by 50 different state laws, and by program issues such as whether non-guaranteed contracts are sold, the association’s role as a seller versus an agent, investment restrictions, and trusting percentages. Injecting preneed asset management with a dose of ERISA could help to discourage hidden fees and improve the quality of fund managers, but the industry also needs an alternative to the strategy of offering funeral directors three investment options to choose from.
 

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We previously discussed how the funeral home or cemetery assumes most of a preneed trust’s investment risk when selling a guaranteed preneed contract, and therefore should be afforded a role in the trust’s investment decisions (Fund Managers: Is Your O&E Coverage Current?). But in that same post, we were careful to point out that there are no absolutes. More funeral homes are switching to non-guaranteed preneed. And, a certain percentage of guaranteed preneed contracts are also re-written at death when the family switches funeral homes or revises the prearranged funeral (or burial) arrangement. Yet, preneed fiduciaries seem to ignore these facts when relying upon uniform trust code provisions for their authority to exchange investment powers for a hold harmless agreement.

Death care fiduciaries first need to determine whether there are any conflicts between the applicable state death care law and the broader uniform trust code. Fiduciaries in states such as Missouri and Kansas are bound by statutes which require the trustee to retain investment oversight. Such conflicts will be reconciled in favor of the more specific death care law.

If the death care law is silent on investment delegation, the applicable uniform trust code may not necessarily authorize the trustee’s exculpation from investment oversight. Some states’ trust code conditions the fiduciary’s investment exculpation upon 1) the appropriateness of the trustee’s selection of the investment advisor, and 2) upon the notice given to trust beneficiaries. Illinois’ Trusts and Trustees Act is a good example of such a requirement. But too frequently, the fiduciary views the funeral home, or cemetery, as the sole beneficiary of the death care trust for purposes of both requirements.

Assuming notice could be given to each and every preneed contract purchaser, a court would likely evaluate the sufficiency of that notice from the perspective of the elderly preneed contract beneficiary. Would the average preneed purchaser understand the implications of the investment delegation? Or, could that purchaser effectively monitor the investment decisions made pursuant to the delegation? The fiduciary’s reliance on the uniform trust code for authority for exculpation under such circumstances should be deemed unreasonable. The validity of the exculpation may also hinge on the investment advisor’s assumption of applicable death care compliance requirements. If the agency agreement does not properly incorporate a death care law’s investment restrictions (or standard), the fiduciary has not exercised ‘reasonable care, skill and caution’ in establishing the scope and terms of the delegation. Yet, I hesitate to fault the fiduciary for trying. The strategy for seeking the exculpation is often in response to the unreasonable expectations of both the industry and its regulators.

As witnessed in California, regulators often interpret archaic preneed laws so as to argue that a ‘preneed contract is the equivalent of a savings account’. Those statutes reflect the preneed transaction from a generation ago. By applying that law out of the current context, a fiction is used to establish a standard that all fiduciaries could fail. The regulator’s position seeks to make the fiduciary a guarantor of the purchaser’s deposits to trust. The reality is that every trust investment has risk, even our government’s bonds. This exposure is applicable regardless of whether the preneed contract is guaranteed or non-guaranteed.

On the other side of the table, the industry is coming to demand that the trust offset more than just the costs of performing the preneed contract. Lagging membership revenues are an issue for many state associations. The mortgage crisis hit many preneed trusts, and preneed sellers expect those losses to be recovered without additional risk. Greater trust returns are also needed to offset the cremation trend. Of course, the asset management required for higher returns comes at a greater cost to the trust.

The reality is that the industry will continue to be request better returns from the death care trust. As with other trusts, the circumstances may dictate that as expectations rise, a fiduciary may best discharge its duties by delegating the investment responsibilities to an investment advisor. As discussed in the linked law review article, the model uniform code should be used to support the delegation of investment duties. But, in contrast to the classic trust situation, the death care trust is a creature of statute, which has the consumer’s protection as its purpose. While the preneed seller may be allowed to step into the settlor’s shoes for purpose of authorizing the delegation, the seller cannot override the preneed statute by exculpating the fiduciary from investment liabilities. At a minimum, the fiduciary needs to stand ready to override investments that are unsuitable or clearly imprudent. The two largest preneed scandals involved investments which were clearly unsuitable for the death care trust. Despite what Merrill Lynch may argue, I doubt any corporate fiduciary would have found the key man insurance policy to have been suitable for investment for a preneed trust. And if R.S.Mo. Section 436.031 had been written differently, NPS’ Missouri fiduciaries would have sought more information about the insurance transactions they were directed to make.
 

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A short three and a half years ago, the funeral industry reeled from the collapse of National Prearranged Services and the emerging story of the Illinois Master Trust. The NFDA was slow to respond to the crisis, and when it did, this blog joined the criticism. Fast forward to September 2012, and the NFDA responds to the Wisconsin Master Trust controversy with the same guidelines.

Granted: associations are cumbersome organizations that are dependent on volunteer members.

Granted: changing the mindset of a membership that has been historically opposed to preneed will be difficult.

Granted: it is a matter of time before another state association master trust fails.

We need to augment the advice offered the NFDA in 2009: eliminate from your trust evaluation guidelines any suggestions that a guaranteed rate of return is permissible. The days of set rates of return or book/tax cost of account for distributions are over.

The fixed rate of return approach allowed the Wisconsin and Illinois programs to avoid investment transparency and individual account allocations of income and market value. But, providing investment transparency in terms of the investments held by the trust, and the rate of return, can be more complex that the NFDA guidelines suggest. It is not uncommon for three or more investment pools to be offered by a master trust program. Administrators may have different ways to provide transparency at the trust level, in terms of in investments held by the trust and their rates of returns.

Whatever procedure is followed, the end result should be a ‘mark to market’ that will allow an auditor to reconcile each individual preneed contract’s value to the individual funeral home account(s), and in the case of master trusts, each individual funeral home’s account(s) to the aggregate master trust market value.
 

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While the reasons are open to debate, it is common knowledge within the funeral industry that a small percentage of consumers cancel their preneed contracts. Consequently, some funeral directors tend to view their preneed block of business with a degree of certainty. Performance of the contracts, and recognition of the revenues, seems to be just a matter of timing. A few state laws reflect the perception that performance of the preneed contract is a ‘lock’. For 37 years, Missouri law allowed preneed sellers to withdraw trust income. Nevada’s law has similar provisions. Preneed trust income became a source of funds that could subsidize funeral home operations.

While the preneed subsidy had long been a source of frustration for certain Missouri officials, they were powerless to stop the practice until the failure of National Prearranged Services. With the 2009 passage of Senate Bill No.1, Missouri officials feel they have a law that they can use to force a new business model upon the funeral industry.

In the case of the California Master Trust, the Department of Consumer Affairs has taken a similar position with regard to an administrative fee that has been paid to participating funeral homes for decades. Consistent with the historic industry view, the CFDA response relies in part upon the preneed guarantee and the risk assumed by the funeral home.

The position becomes tenuous when the administrative fee is judged on terms of whether a necessary service has been rendered to the trust, and whether the amount paid is reasonable for the services received. It is apparent from the documents that the DCA will also apply that analysis to what the CFDA has charged the trust. Depending upon how this controversy is resolved, other states’ regulators may ask whether the administrative fees charged to the master trust are appropriate.

As a recent Funeral Service Insider comment suggests, some industry associations have also become dependent upon the preneed subsidy. The classic guaranteed argument loses traction when facts such as those in Illinois emerge. By one account, non-guaranteed preneed contracts accounted for one third of the contracts administered by the IFDA.

But, in defense of the CMT, preneed trusts are labor-intensive enterprises where the funeral home, administrator and fiduciary have shared responsibilities. In its challenge of a different CMT issue (the maintenance of preneed records within California), the DCA acknowledges this reality while discussing the funeral home’s recordkeeping duties. Effective field examinations will require that certain preneed records be maintained at the funeral home. But, is it reasonable to impose greater administrative requirements on the funeral home without allowing any compensation to be paid to them?

The emerging regulatory challenge to the preneed subsidy is premised on the position that the funeral home’s right to preneed funds does not vest until the contract is performed. That position is consistent with Missouri’s efforts to improve portability. But, regulators must also find a consistent and reasonable position with regard to the services that they mandate from the funeral home. 

(The Funeral Service Insider excerpt was included by special permission from Kates-Boylston Publications and Funeral Service Insider.)

 

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In contrast to how the IFDA situation was handled, the California Department of Consumer Affairs has taken a public approach to disclosing its issues with the CFDA’s master trust by posting its website an audit report and the Association’s reply.

The DCA is unhappy with the Association, and the master trust fiduciary, with regard to (among other things) the fees that have been charged to the trust, the authorities that have been delegated by the fiduciary, and their refusals to respond to certain audit inquiries and document requests.

The audit report reflects a very literal interpretation of the applicable California laws. A close reading of the report should leave one scratching his/her head on a few of the issues (hint: corpus issues). But, auditors have no choice but to apply the laws that are applicable to the entity under examination, and unfortunately, the California preneed law and rules are dated and disjunctive.

For those who summarily advise that the audit report and the DCA actions reflect yet another example of a preneed program gone bad, that is not the case.

The DCA website includes the April 29th response from the law firm representing the Association. I doubt the attorneys knew that the letter would end up on the DCA website, but the reply is very illustrative of the issues that exist with a dated, and ambiguous, law. While the Association has made some serious missteps with regard to some of the law’s ambiguities, the auditor’s interpretations of the law and its requirements are inconsistent or unreasonable in some respects. Accordingly, the DCA would be well advised to accept the offer extended in the “Conclusions” on page 46 of the reply.

The crucial issues raised by this dispute are relevant to all master trusts, and will be addressed in future posts. Hopefully, the DCA will continue to make the discussions and eventual resolutions public so that death care regulators and preneed program administrators can take note.
 

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The September edition of the Mortuary Management ran an excerpt from a Funeral Monitor article about the California Master Trust suffering a deficit. 

If the story is accurate about the master trust's shortage, the author's speculation about the reasons for the deficit omits a possible factor that has existed for years: the 4% administration fee. 

As explained by the Cemetery and Funeral Bureau's audit guide, California law allows for an annual 4% administration fee.  If the CMT takes the full administration fee allowed by law, no wonder the trust is running a bit short.

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Who do you turn to when grass isn’t being cut, or the grave marker falls over? Or, who can approve the transfer of the ownership of my mother’s grave space? 

Ultimately, the answer depends on who owns the cemetery. But, determining who owns the cemetery can often prove confusing to both the public and the cemetery regulator. 

A recent Manteca Bulletin article about the ‘friends’ of the East Union Cemetery would seem to be just another story about a pioneer cemetery that has no funds for care and maintenance. But a closer examination suggests a situation where concerned citizens signed on to serve on a cemetery association board without understanding the accompanying responsibilities. 

East Union Cemetery is located in Manteca, California, a community of 50,000 that is located 80 miles east of San Francisco. As with most “public” cemeteries, East Union Cemetery is required by state law to file reports for authority to continue operations. But apparently, East Union Cemetery failed to file those reports a few years ago and the California Cemetery and Funeral Bureau began to send out notices.   When no one responded, the state began to investigate, and issues of ownership, missing funds and accountability began to surface. 

News reports indicate the cemetery had an endowment fund of $800,000 as recently as ten years ago. But then, one member was accused of embezzling funds and the cemetery association board membership dwindled down to two members. 

With the state still conducting its investigation, Manteka’s citizens responded to the situation by forming a new and expanded cemetery association board. However, reports and regulator press releases suggest that the new board may have exceeded its authorities in the zeal to address the cemetery’s needs. Subsequent to the appointment of the new board, the state seized the cemetery’s remaining funds and submitted a proposed agreement to the cemetery association. Shocked by this turn of events, the new board resigned, and pointed a finger at the cemetery regulators. 

The facts suggest the cemetery association board did not appreciate the laws governing cemetery care funds. It may be that the new board followed a course of action that had transpired over the past ten years. Endowment care (or perpetual care) funds are intended to provide income to subsidize the cemetery’s maintenance expenses. Most states’ cemetery laws prohibit the fund fiduciary from invading principal to meet the cemetery’s needs. 

The California Cemetery and Funeral Bureau is caught between a rock and a hard spot. Well-intended citizens stepped up to a situation that demanded attention, but acted without knowing the rules.   The Bureau’s press release and Q&A posting help tell its side of the situation. 

Individuals who have an interest in serving on a cemetery association board need to appreciate the responsibilities that accompany that service.   Those responsibilities will be defined in part by the association articles and bylaws, applicable state cemetery laws and the agreements and documents that bind the association.   As witnessed by a lawsuit filed recently in Brooklyn, New York, those legal documents have life beyond the grave. 

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