Preneed Fund Manager: Is your O&E coverage current?

Many state preneed regulators share the point of view that the payments made toward a preneed contract belong to the consumer until the prearranged funeral is provided. This perspective was adopted by the California Attorney General in its Eighth Cause of Action brought against the California Funeral Directors Association and its Master Trust. The AG criticizes the CFDA for investment decisions that are fairly representative of those taken by the industry as a whole.

Early on, the CMT relied upon bond funds that specialized in zero coupon government bonds. The AG points out that U.S. Treasury Bonds and similar bond funds outperformed the CMT at less risk and with lower fees.

When the bond market crashed in 2001, the CMT experienced substantial investment losses and changed investment course. The CMT began diversifying, and purchasing mortgaged back securities, foreign bonds and notes, corporate asset-backed securities and other types of securities. The AG criticizes these investments by stating “these types of investments are not insured bank accounts, are not bonds that are legal investments for commercial bank (sections 1001 et seq. of the Financial Code lists certain legal investments for commercial banks), are not government bonds, and do not comply with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (as discussed below).”

The AG goes on to argue that the investment policies of the CMT should be set by the risk and return objectives of the preneed contract beneficiaries, and faults the defendants for having set investment policies based on their own needs.

Other states’ preneed regulators (and cemetery regulators) share the California AG’s point of view. It is common to hear a regulator characterize the preneed trust as a depository account or to express the belief the industry would be better off if preneed funding were left to the insurance companies. These regulators need to take the blinders off.

The CMT, like so many preneed trusts, went into tax exempt investments after 1988 because of Revenue Rul. 87-127. The Internal Revenue Service pushed for an income reporting method that proved impractical and burdensome. To compound the situation, the IRS applied the ruling retroactively to certain states. California was one of those states. Prior to the ruling, funeral homes had no reason to require the consumer’s social security number when selling a preneed contract. Consequently, many California trustees could not comply with the ruling with regard to existing contracts.

The ruling required grantor statements to be sent to consumers, and the consumers complained. So, funeral homes instructed their preneed fiduciaries to go into anything that didn’t require a grantor statement. While the CMT went to zero coupon bonds, the IFDA went into the poorly conceived key man insurance. Other trusts went into annuities. Various approaches were taken because the IRS could not provide reporting guidance once it changed the rules.

In stating that the preneed funds must be invested pursuant to the contract beneficiary’s objectives, the California AG has ignored the fact that a majority of these preneed contracts are probably guaranteed. Under that arrangement, the funeral home has assumed the investment risk. From a practical approach, how would the investment advisor determine the objectives of the thousands of preneed beneficiaries? In a prior post, this blog reported about an Illinois contract beneficiary’s complaint about the IFDA Master Trust. In contrast to the losses suffered by the member funeral homes, the beneficiary experienced a modest return on her non-guaranteed contract. Her complaint was that the return was not enough to keep up with rising funeral costs.

The California AG argument that the CMT must comply with the Prudent Investor Rule in a way that does not expose trust principal to risk is the equivalent to handcuffing both of the investment advisor’s hands behind his back.

Of the investment complaints made by the California AG, the one which would seem to merit the most attention would be the relationship between the former investment advisor and a CFDA board member. That CFDA board member also served as a trustee for one of the advisor’s funds, for which he received compensation. That relationship warrants an inquiry whether the relationship was disclosed and the compensation appropriate and reasonable.

The AG’s argument that the investment advisor must be independent from the seller is one shared by Missouri regulators. The Missouri regulators are quick to point to the abuses committed by NPS and its investment management firm. (See our post titled “The Zeal for Independence”). Those abuses were so bad that the Missouri legislature passed a provision prohibiting a relationship between the seller and the fund manager. This author thought the provision went too far. (See our post titled “Regulating Out of Context”). With the passage of SB 325, the Missouri Funeral Directors Association has convinced the Missouri legislature that it did go too far.

Regardless of whether the fund manager is a fiduciary employee or an independent investment advisor, that fund manager should appropriately look to the preneed seller for input about investment objectives. For the larger trust, the fiduciary and fund manager should adopt a written investment policy that, among other factors, considers the trust’s mix of guaranteed and non-guaranteed contracts. If the fund manager is an independent investment advisor, the relationship should be documented with an agreement that discloses all forms of compensation. Consistent with the SEC efforts to reform mutual funds, the disclosure should address any 12b-1 fees. The agreement with the fiduciary should also disclose all relationships the investment advisor has with the preneed seller.

To the extent the preneed contract is guaranteed, the regulator needs to recognize the seller’s economic interest in the trust’s performance. But, fiduciaries and sellers need to consider the growing number of non-guaranteed contracts and the possibility that the guaranteed contract may be serviced by a different funeral home. While the seller may have the prevailing economic interest, not all of the trust may be considered his for investment purposes.

 

The Preneed Subsidy

While the reasons are open to debate, it is common knowledge within the funeral industry that a small percentage of consumers cancel their preneed contracts. Consequently, some funeral directors tend to view their preneed block of business with a degree of certainty. Performance of the contracts, and recognition of the revenues, seems to be just a matter of timing. A few state laws reflect the perception that performance of the preneed contract is a ‘lock’. For 37 years, Missouri law allowed preneed sellers to withdraw trust income. Nevada’s law has similar provisions. Preneed trust income became a source of funds that could subsidize funeral home operations.

While the preneed subsidy had long been a source of frustration for certain Missouri officials, they were powerless to stop the practice until the failure of National Prearranged Services. With the 2009 passage of Senate Bill No.1, Missouri officials feel they have a law that they can use to force a new business model upon the funeral industry.

In the case of the California Master Trust, the Department of Consumer Affairs has taken a similar position with regard to an administrative fee that has been paid to participating funeral homes for decades. Consistent with the historic industry view, the CFDA response relies in part upon the preneed guarantee and the risk assumed by the funeral home.

The position becomes tenuous when the administrative fee is judged on terms of whether a necessary service has been rendered to the trust, and whether the amount paid is reasonable for the services received. It is apparent from the documents that the DCA will also apply that analysis to what the CFDA has charged the trust. Depending upon how this controversy is resolved, other states’ regulators may ask whether the administrative fees charged to the master trust are appropriate.

As a recent Funeral Service Insider comment suggests, some industry associations have also become dependent upon the preneed subsidy. The classic guaranteed argument loses traction when facts such as those in Illinois emerge. By one account, non-guaranteed preneed contracts accounted for one third of the contracts administered by the IFDA.

But, in defense of the CMT, preneed trusts are labor-intensive enterprises where the funeral home, administrator and fiduciary have shared responsibilities. In its challenge of a different CMT issue (the maintenance of preneed records within California), the DCA acknowledges this reality while discussing the funeral home’s recordkeeping duties. Effective field examinations will require that certain preneed records be maintained at the funeral home. But, is it reasonable to impose greater administrative requirements on the funeral home without allowing any compensation to be paid to them?

The emerging regulatory challenge to the preneed subsidy is premised on the position that the funeral home’s right to preneed funds does not vest until the contract is performed. That position is consistent with Missouri’s efforts to improve portability. But, regulators must also find a consistent and reasonable position with regard to the services that they mandate from the funeral home. 

(The Funeral Service Insider excerpt was included by special permission from Kates-Boylston Publications and Funeral Service Insider.)

 

California Master Trust: serious missteps, but not another IFDA

In contrast to how the IFDA situation was handled, the California Department of Consumer Affairs has taken a public approach to disclosing its issues with the CFDA’s master trust by posting its website an audit report and the Association’s reply.

The DCA is unhappy with the Association, and the master trust fiduciary, with regard to (among other things) the fees that have been charged to the trust, the authorities that have been delegated by the fiduciary, and their refusals to respond to certain audit inquiries and document requests.

The audit report reflects a very literal interpretation of the applicable California laws. A close reading of the report should leave one scratching his/her head on a few of the issues (hint: corpus issues). But, auditors have no choice but to apply the laws that are applicable to the entity under examination, and unfortunately, the California preneed law and rules are dated and disjunctive.

For those who summarily advise that the audit report and the DCA actions reflect yet another example of a preneed program gone bad, that is not the case.

The DCA website includes the April 29th response from the law firm representing the Association. I doubt the attorneys knew that the letter would end up on the DCA website, but the reply is very illustrative of the issues that exist with a dated, and ambiguous, law. While the Association has made some serious missteps with regard to some of the law’s ambiguities, the auditor’s interpretations of the law and its requirements are inconsistent or unreasonable in some respects. Accordingly, the DCA would be well advised to accept the offer extended in the “Conclusions” on page 46 of the reply.

The crucial issues raised by this dispute are relevant to all master trusts, and will be addressed in future posts. Hopefully, the DCA will continue to make the discussions and eventual resolutions public so that death care regulators and preneed program administrators can take note.