Dig Deeper: the price of Merrill Lynch's divorce from the IFDA

In rejecting the $18 million settlement forced upon IFDA members, an Illinois Circuit Court is telling Merrill Lynch Life Agency to dig deeper into its pocket to compensate funeral homes. As reported by the Springfield Journal-Register, the $18 million represents the revenues the insurance broker received from the sale of key man insurance to the IFDA master trust. Apparently, Merrill Lynch convinced the Illinois Department of Insurance (DOI) that the funeral homes’ damages should be measured in terms of the benefit that Merrill Lynch received. But as the editor of the Memorial Business Journal* suggests, the Circuit Court seems more inclined to consider a ‘deeper’ measure of damages, and that will require the parties to the litigation to assess the master trust’s true loss.

The master trust collapse is framed by a ‘value’ that was set by a fixed return (2%) on consumer deposits. Based on that ‘value’, the loss is reported to be close to $100 million. But, one question funeral directors may be forced to answer will be whether the trust could have attained that value with the investment restrictions imposed by the members and the expenses taken by the IFDA. Another issue that may be raised is whether the IFDA’s past executives and attorneys bear some of the responsibilities for either selecting the investments or approving them. If so, comparative negligence may force the IFDA to shoulder responsibility for a portion of the damages.

The situation begs for a negotiated settlement, and it is unfortunate that time and expense was wasted on an end run with a regulator that had little, if any, authority over the IFDA master trust.
 

*"Reprinted with permission from the March 4, 2010 issue of the Memorial Business Journal. To subscribe please call 609-815-8145."

Insurable interest and the IFDA master trust

The Illinois Division of Insurance made the right call: the IFDA master trust does not have an insurable interest in the lives of the members who participate in the trust.

A preneed trust is intended to fund the liability that arises when the preneed beneficiary dies and a funeral must be provided. Accordingly, it is appropriate for a preneed trust to hold insurance covering the life of the contract beneficiary. At the time of death, the trust will receive insurance proceeds, and if the trust is established correctly, the proceeds are excluded from being taxed pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 101(a). The amount distributed by the trust to the funeral home is treated as ordinary income.

While the funeral director may have a financial interest in the performance of the preneed contract, the director’s death does not create a liability for the preneed trust. In the absence of a risk of loss, the policy held by the preneed trust is taxed as though it were an investment contract. Once the fiduciary factors in the tax consequences and the mortality charge, the decision to dump the key man policies makes sense.

Now the accusations turn to why this wasn’t done sooner. Or, why were these policies purchased in the first place. The broker’s excuse dodges the responsibilities he had to perform research, make inquiries and report accurately to the insurance companies.

Where was the IFDA counsel when these insurance purchases were being made?

Perhaps the regulators have exposure as well, but that may depend on what was disclosed by the IFDA (and when).
 

The IRS and its role in the IFDA master trust problems

As new allegations surface about the Merrill Lynch broker associated with the IFDA master trust, some may appropriately ask why a preneed trust would ever invest in an insurance product. There was a time when the twain shall never meet. That all changed in January 1988, and specifically when the IRS and Treasury decided to apply Rev. Rul. 87-127 retroactively to states ‘that should have known’ the funeral home/grantor method of income reporting was inappropriate.

Prior to the ruling, preneed trustees were taking different approaches to reporting the income earned by the trust. With regard to states such as California and Illinois, the trust was required to accrue income and the Service believed trusts from those states lacked authority for electing the grantor method with the preneed seller as grantor.

Consequently, the Service leveled the boom by serving notice that the ruling would be applied retroactively in certain states. This posed a genuine problem for existing trusts because most lacked the requisite consumer information to report income in compliance with the ruling. Thus started a mad scramble to find an alternative to income reporting, and thus began the exodus to insurance.

Today, preneed trustees can avoid the burden of Rev. Rul. 87-127 by electing taxation pursuant to IRC Section 685. While a few legitimate reasons for preneed trusts to hold an insurance product remain, the insurance transaction merits close scrutiny, particularly when a conversion of existing assets to insurance is involved (NPS and its Missouri trusts).

The preneed trustee should ask certain fundamental questions of those who seek to have the trust invest in insurance:

· How will this product be taxed upon maturity?
· Does this product provide the requisite liquidity to fund cancellations?
· Is a commission paid, and to whom?
· How strong is the policy’s issuer?
 

To the extent a life insurance policy is utilized, the decision invariably becomes an irrevocable election. The policy’s cash value generally precludes getting back out.

Generally, annuities provide a more flexible alternative to life insurance, but pitfalls still exist. In recent years, funeral directors have received solicitations to have their preneed trusts invest in a group, variable annuity product. Trustees still need to ask these fundamental questions, particularly when an investment broker is advising the funeral director.

With regard to the taxation of the insurance product, few seem to realize that the trust is dependent upon Rev. Rul. 87-127 for the desired tax consequence.

For those interested in the history of Rev. Rul. 87-127, and its alternative reporting method (Section 685), Professor Joel Newman provided a fair and accurate account in 80 Tax Notes 711.