Oak Ridge Cemetery: Netting to Make Ends Meet

In relation to many of its peers, Springfield’s Oak Ridge Cemetery could be labeled progressive. Oak Ridge maintains both an endowed care trust and a preneed trust. In contrast, a substantial number of the country’s cemeteries have neither. The fact that Oak Ridge Cemetery is owned and operated by the City of Springfield, Illinois, makes the cemetery even more remarkable. Few municipal cemeteries have such funds, and instead, must be subsidized by taxpayers for operating funds. Despite the foresight of Oak Ridge’s board of directors, the cemetery has had to resort to “netting” the past few years to make ends meet. They have done so to the tune of almost a million dollars, and Springfield’s Mayor is being advised that drastic action is necessary.

The Mayor’s attorney blames Oak Ridge’s board of directors for bad investments and netting deposits, and recommends that the control of the cemetery be changed. With the increase in cremations (and the decline in burials), the Oak Ridge board failed to adapt, and instead, spent the funds that should have been contributed to the trusts. To make up for the decline in trust contributions, the board took more risks with trust investments, which exposed the trusts to the market declines of 2008. The combination of netting consumer payments and investment declines put Oak Ridge in a deep hole. And now, the Mayor’s attorney thinks it’s time for a change in management, and for the cemetery to start living within its means. Sounds like sage advice, but it’s not very practical.

Turning Oak Ridge over to the city’s park and recreational department will only ensure a decline in the cemetery’s operations. While the cemetery’s board may be guilty of staying with their old business plan too long, those individuals are more familiar with the operation of a cemetery than those city employees who oversee Springfield’s parks.

Regarding ‘bad’ investments, the Mayor’s attorney suggests the cemetery board should have stayed conservative. The problem with that advice is that the 2008 market crash hit mortgage-backed securities the hardest, which happens to be the ‘bread and butter’ of most cemetery trust funds. The fact is that most cemetery trusts may be too heavily invested in fixed income, and the need is to diversify their investments (as opposed to ‘going conservative’). (In that the Mayor’s attorney is the same individual who defended the IFDA master trust’s investment in key man insurance, this criticism rings a little hollow.)

While Springfield needs to make the Oak Ridge board more accountable, those members should be given the opportunity to develop a new business plan for the cemetery. The decline in traditional burials is inevitable, and cemeteries must plan accordingly. While the costs of the traditional funeral and burial are a leading factor to the rise in cremations, cemeteries need to evaluate the prices charged for their interment rights and services. They also need to evaluate the need for marketing. One such opportunity is to market to the consumer who has already chosen cremation. Another opportunity is to form marketing alliances with funeral homes.

Or, the Mayor could pull in the reigns and allow the taxpayer to foot the bill.
 

Chris Butler's attempt to set the record straight

The IFDA seems to be everyone’s favorite whipping boy. Even prominent industry leaders are stepping back from the Association in its time of need. The epicenter for the latest news on the IFDA’s troubles has been the Springfield Journal-Register and Bruce Rushton. Mr. Rushton has done a thorough and excellent job of reporting on the IFDA master trust. In support of that reporting, the Journal-Register published an editorial calling for action to protect Illinois consumers. In response, Springfield funeral director Chris Butler wrote to the Journal-Register to present a different perspective of the reporting and editorial. I, for one, agree with Mr. Butler that the Journal-Register is contributing to the confusion and anxieties of consumers who hold a preneed contract.

References to the IFDA master trust as a Ponzi scheme have been abused. It’s a fact that the IFDA made promises to its membership that it has not been able to keep. In a very literal sense, this may seem to fit the Ponzi scheme definition, but the IFDA master trust does not begin to equate to the Bernie Madoff fraud, or even the NPS business model. Certain factors have contributed to a liquidity problem for the master trust. The single greatest factor, the collapse of the financial markets, is completely beyond the IFDA’s control. Rather than sell off assets at a loss, fiduciaries in this situation would prefer to use incoming funds to meet liquidity needs. This is not the classic Ponzi scheme.

As Mr. Butler suggests, it is the Illinois funeral director who will bear most of the financial consequences of the master trust deficits. While there is a legitimate exposure to the consumers holding non-guaranteed contracts, the IFDA must be afforded the opportunity to do right by these consumers. Contrary to what the Journal-Register suggests, state law does not appear to ensure these consumers ‘can’t lose money on their investment’. In reality, the non-guaranteed contract purchaser has investment risk because of the decision to forego the guaranteed contract.  Granted, the consumer may not have been able to afford the guaranteed contract (and its required installment payments).  But, the non-guaranteed contract represents a fund set aside for use at a future date (without promises from the funeral home about what those funds will purchase). 

When a funeral home steps forward to honor a non-guaranteed contract regardless of the deficit, the consumer should recognize that the funeral director is covering the deficit out of a commitment to the family, and not because of a state law.   Consumers of guaranteed contracts should also appreciate that funeral homes are honoring those contracts despite legitimate controversies over their obligation to do so. 

The IFDA and its advisors made serious mistakes, but so did the regulators. Oversight fell through the cracks several years ago. Restructuring the master trust and its oversight could take years. The reform process will only take longer if misplaced criticism must be addressed at every step.