Death Care Law Blog : Kansas Death Care and Preneed Lawyer & Attorney : Stalter Legal Services Law Firm : Funeral Law, Elder Law : Kansas City

Here is proof that readership of newspapers is going down.

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel called a few weeks back about a Wisconsin legislative bill that sought investment freedom for cemetery trust funds.  With the legislative battle that was waged a year ago in Wisconsin, we had expected the bill might represent a renewed effort to allow common ownership of funeral homes and cemeteries.  But instead, five Wisconsin legislators are sponsoring a proposal that would allow Wisconsin cemeteries to bypass fiduciary institutions and allow their trust funds to be administered by broker-dealers. The lead sponsor commented to the newspaper reporter that “It’s really not a big deal. Cemeteries are already investing with these folks.”  The sponsor indicated that he introduced the bill at the request of a stockbroker who had been investing a cemetery’s funds for years without knowing he had been doing so illegally.      

Death care operators should take note that the duties of the “fund manager” differ as between a broker-dealer and a registered investment advisor (RIA).  As explained in the SEC’s 2011 “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers”, while the RIA has a fiduciary duty to know his client, the broker-dealer does not have such a relationship unless the circumstances dictate otherwise.  The broker-dealer is only required to make recommendations consistent with the customer’s interests.  Ask any RIA if the difference is important.  But, the Wisconsin cemetery bill underscores the duty that is missing from both RIAs and broker-dealers: the duty to comply with the laws applicable to the client’s trust fund. 

The OCC made this duty known to federally chartered preneed trustees more than 10 years ago.  But, a broker-dealer has no duty to stay up on Wisconsin’s Chapter 157.  It makes you wonder whether the sponsors of Assembly Bill 79 were staying up with the troubles of the Wisconsin Master Trust. 

But then again, that trust did have a fiduciary.    

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If you haven’t noticed, there has been some turnover among the associations’ preneed fund managers. With the threat of additional litigation in Wisconsin, this trend could continue. But not all of the turnover has been as publicized as what we have seen in Illinois and Wisconsin. After 20 years at the helm, Merrill Lynch recently gave notice to the Michigan Funeral Directors Association of its resignation. There are no search protocols for preneed fund managers, and so Michigan borrowed from the retirement fund community by publishing a request for proposal (RFP). While the MFDA should be commended in their effort to bring transparency to their program’s asset management, they missed (or ignored) an opportunity to shift more investment responsibilities to the financial industry. Instead of using FINRA Rule 2111 (“know your client”) to their advantage, the MFDA structured the RFP to perpetuate (and extend) the funeral director’s controlling role in investment decisions.

Hidden investment charges have been ‘part of business’ in the death care industry for decades, and this author has contemplated whether ERISA’s fee disclosure requirements could ever be incorporated into preneed trusts by the Federal Trade Commission. The Michigan RFP focused on the same ERISA fee disclosure requirements, which could lead one to assume that association’s leaders did not want to make the same mistake again. The Michigan RFP also raised another ERISA concept worthy of the preneed industry’s consideration: the 401K approach to investment by individual contract. We too have wondered why larger programs have not looked at data from individual contracts and the sponsoring funeral homes to build an investment options matrix.

But, the Michigan RFP can be faulted for cutting off the diligence requirements of FINRA Rule 2111. To insulate the Association from solicitations, the RFP provided summary information about the program and required all inquiries to go through an ERISA consultant. Prospective fund managers were required to submit investment strategies on limited facts and without direct communications to the Association. It is understandable that the Association would want to narrow the field before initiating an exchange of confidential information with prospective managers, but the screening of candidates should have preceded the request for investment strategies. Subsequent to the screening, the MFDA should then have provided detailed information pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Under FINRA 2111, this sequence would have expanded the fund manager’s diligence responsibilities regarding investment strategy recommendations. The nature of the questions posed by the candidates would also have helped the MFDA in its assessment of the candidates. Instead, the RFP narrowed the fund manager’s diligence to an old investment strategy with a history of mixed results and challenges.

Within the context of ERISA retirement funds, RFPs may take a formula approach to finding a replacement fund manager. But the preneed industry is fragmented by 50 different state laws, and by program issues such as whether non-guaranteed contracts are sold, the association’s role as a seller versus an agent, investment restrictions, and trusting percentages. Injecting preneed asset management with a dose of ERISA could help to discourage hidden fees and improve the quality of fund managers, but the industry also needs an alternative to the strategy of offering funeral directors three investment options to choose from.
 

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In the days that followed the Wisconsin Funeral Directors Association being placed into receivership, some of the WFDA’s sister associations were quick to point out they had ‘checks and balances’ that would protect consumers’ funds from the problems that tripped up the Wisconsin Funeral Trust. As we reported in our last post, a crucial ‘check and balance’ missing from the WFT was investment oversight. The fact that a trust has a corporate trustee does not necessarily mean that fiduciary has responsibility for monitoring the prudence of the investments. Corporate fiduciaries often look to uniform trust codes for the authority to delegate investment responsibilities. If a grantor wishes to use an outside asset manager, general trust laws will accommodate those wishes. The problem with preneed trusts (and cemetery endowment funds) is that there is more than one “grantor” to the preneed trust.

We have previously stated our support for allowing a relationship between preneed seller and a qualified fund manager. However, the fiduciary must provide a ‘check and balance’ to that relationship by maintaining responsibility for the investments. The ‘scandals’ from Missouri, Illinois, California and Wisconsin stem from a lack of investment oversight. Missouri’s regulators responded to NPS with a law that precluded any relationship between the advisor and the seller. Appropriately, the Missouri association obtained revisions to allow an agency relationship between its fund manager and the trustee. However, the Missouri law does not go far enough to require the disclosures we recommended in 2011. Funeral directors and consumers need to know that Missouri preneed fiduciaries ‘have their back’ when it comes to investment oversight.

Investment oversight is also a concern for cemetery regulators. Kansas’ cemetery regulators were dismayed to find that a corporate trustee had turned over the investment reigns to a Hutchinson cemetery operator. The operator hoped to cover declining revenues (and the failure to make trust deposits) with higher investment returns. For months, the operator attempted to hide the ball from the auditor, but eventually it was discovered that those investments had lost hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The investment supervision issue is also a concern for Nebraska regulators. As they prep the death care industry for legislation in 2013, they raise this issue:

Seller’s Power to Direct Investments

A question has arisen regarding the seller’s ability to direct the trustee’s investment decisions. Specifically, should the seller be able to instruct the trustee to deposit or invest funds in securities that do not meet the trustee’s own investment guidelines?

If it is determined that the trustee should be free from the seller’s investment influence, section 12-1107 should be amended to reflect this fact.
 

In what may be a perfectly legal arrangement, Illinois funeral directors have handed off investment oversight to their new fund managers. The master trust instrument carefully outlines the code provisions which authorize the delegation of investment authorities. But the document goes that extra step of exculpating the trustee from responsibilities for investment oversight. Where is the check and balance in that structure? Are the industry’s expectations so high that a trustee will not accept the fund without a hold harmless? If the industry does not establish its own ‘checks and balances’ with regard to investment supervision, the authority to participate in the investment decisions could be taken away.
 

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Not that close, even from the 30,000-foot view.

That’s our assessment of the Morningstar analysis of preneed and its impact on the death care industry. In “Dark Clouds for the Death-Care Industry”, a stock analyst attempted to explain the preneed transaction, and then provide an assessment of the impact of preneed on the profitability of the death care industry. Such attempts to generalize preneed are often misleading, particularly by an outsider looking in.

While the analyst raises a number of issues regarding preneed, only one can be described as generally accurate: there is a growing reliance on preneed sales. But then, operators in the smaller or rural communities may disagree because they do not face the competitive pressures that drive preneed sales. For the majority of the industry’s operators, competition has made preneed a necessity.

The article suggests that all preneed sales end up in trusts, and that the trust exposes the operator to investment risks. While this generalization has some merit, it completely ignores insurance funded preneed, and how those sales provide a background to assess the analyst’s preneed conclusions.

A majority of the states have preneed funeral laws that impose trusting requirements of 90% or more. The costs associated with a preneed program force larger operators in the 100% states to use insurance funding for the commission that will pay salesmen. The complaint currently heard from these operators is that the return on their insurance proceeds is not keeping pace with inflation.

The analyst states he would feel more comfortable if the industry turned to insurance companies for underwriting of the industry’s massive trust portfolios. Excuse me? The main problem with preneed trusts is that they are saddled with expenses, and are often ‘parked’ in fixed income investments. So, Wall Street’s solution to preneed would be to add a layer of expense through underwriting? Ignoring the state law issues, aren’t you suggesting to the operator that he should sacrifice the upside of his trust for the stability of a lower, more consistent return? How would that recommendation achieve the growth that you state is lacking for this industry?

The analyst also states that the industry must rely on preneed because of the lack of overall deaths in the marketplace. Perhaps the analyst meant to say there is too much competition for the current death rates in our communities. If so, then yes, preneed is becoming as important as heritage in maintaining (or growing) the operator’s market share. If the investment community believes preneed is bad for us, how would Wall Street propose funeral homes and cemeteries respond to competition in the market place?

Wall Street concerns over preneed are driven in part by misconceptions about the operator’s costs, and his exposures to trust funding liabilities. The analyst fails to make a distinction between the cost to perform a preneed contact and the prices listed on a general price list. The amount paid out of a trust when a preneed contract may not equal the current at need prices, but the trust proceeds do generally exceed the costs of the services and merchandise. Depending on the age of the contract, and the state’s trusting requirements, the older contracts may not be very ‘profitable’, but there is a profit, just not as profitable as the comparable at-need service.

The analyst also expresses concern the operator’s liability to fund the trust when the investment markets decline as they did in 2009. What state law requires that? Operators are not required to make ‘capital injections’ into their preneed trusts for investment declines. Such conditions may affect their authority to make income withdrawals, but not to require additional contributions.

Wall Street would prefer the death care industry to return to the day where at-need revenues constitute the base of operations. Most death care operators would share that desire, but most know better. Contrary to the analyst’s conclusion, operators are finding that it is the at-need service that is exposed to downturns in discretionary spending. Tight times make it easier for the consumer to choose cremation. If the preneed contract is paid in full, the family isn’t forced to come out of pocket to pay for the traditional service.

In conclusion, I have to concede that the analyst is somewhat correct about preneed exposing the operator to investment risks. Preneed has become a business reality, requiring many operators to make a decision between insurance or trust. Should the operator take the lower, but safer, rate of return of the insurance policy, or keep the upside of the trust (and its risks)?

Large funeral operators in 100% trusting states don’t have much choice but to use insurance.  For the funeral operator who wants growth and control over the direction of the preneed fund, then there is little choice but to assume the investment market risks that accompany the preneed trust. Cemeteries have no choice but to use the trust, and assume its investment risks. Cemetery preneed can be distinguished from that sold by funeral homes in that some merchandise (and services) is delivered prior to death, precluding the use of insurance.  

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The Springfield Journal-Register recently reported that Illinois' Cemetery Oversight Task Force made a recommendation to restrict preneed trusts to investing in government-backed securities.   While its difficult to actually find that recommendation in the Task Force's report, it is not a bad idea for the consumers who purchased a non-guaranteed preneed contract.  However, that type of restriction would hinder funeral homes that offer guaranteed contracts.

The safety provided by government-backed securities comes at a premium: a lower investment return.  Funeral homes and cemeteries are encountering cost increases that recently have outpaced the returns seen from insurance and trusts.  With regard to preneed trusts, investment return has often lagged behind cost increases because tax issues have been allowed to dictate investment policies.  

In the case of the IFDA, the trust resorted to insurance.  It is also very common to find preneed trusts invested exclusively in tax exempt bonds.  

If funeral homes and cemeteries are to offer guaranteed preneed contracts, applicable law should require trusts to adhere to the prudent investor rule.  While these trusts will always favor an asset allocation heavy with fixed income securities, a diversification is needed to provide protection and reasonable returns.  

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The ICCFA’s November Magazine included an article by Craig Martin that provides good advice for all death care trusts. Death care trusts are notoriously bad performers, and if operators are to improve investment performance they need to work more closely with their fiduciaries and portfolio managers. Mr. Martin offers 5 tips that are equally applicable to preneed trusts and endowment care trusts:

1. Know your investment guidelines (and statutory limitations)
2. Communicate with the investment manager on a regular basis
3. Use a professional fund manager
4. Include growth in the asset allocation
5. Explore the availability of a master trust

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A trade newsletter recently reported on funeral homes forming buying groups to negotiate better terms with casket vendors. Through cooperative alliances, the funeral homes can achieve the numbers required to negotiate better discounts from vendors. Those same economies of scale also benefit preneed programs that utilize trust funding. The larger trust not only provides the operator leverage in negotiating terms with a fiduciary, the trust provides the asset manager the critical mass required for a sophisticated asset allocation model for proper diversification.

However, state laws are often a hurdle to independent funeral homes or cemeteries seeking to form a master trust that would commingle funds from multiple sellers. Laws such as Missouri’s Section 436.031 authorize collective investing by preneed trustees, so long as the funds deposited belong to a single preneed seller. This restriction reflects a legislative concern for the trust’s accounting of deposits, distributions, income and expenses.

Rather than close the door completely on collective investment trusts, the Michigan cemetery law signed into law last week left the door open to a new breed of master trusts.

Section 16 of SB 674 establishes a transition period for Michigan cemeteries to transfer their endowed care trusts to corporate fiduciaries. Subparagraph (2) of that section addresses the traditional master trust established by a single cemetery that has multiple trusts or a master trust among multiple cemeteries with common ownership. The subparagraph also references preneed trusts. The opening for pooling among unrelated trusts comes in subparagraph (3) where Michigan’s cemetery commissioner is given the authority to approve ‘other comparable methods of bundling or pooling of trust or escrow funds for investment purposes’.

The fiduciary services provided by national banks are subject to Federal regulations set out in 12 CFR Part 9 (“Reg 9”), and more specifically, collective investment funds are subject to 12CFR 9.18. State chartered fiduciaries and Office of Thrift Supervision chartered fiduciaries are subject to similar requirements. The fiduciary’s authority to pool preneed trust accounts is derived from 12 CFR 9.18(c)(4). The regulation sends the fiduciary back to state law for its authority, and prohibitions. In the absence of express authority (and express prohibitions), the fiduciary is in ‘no man’s land’ with whether it is required to follow the requirements of Reg 9, which include a written plan, audits and asset valuations.

The Michigan law seems to appreciate that Reg 9 requirements go beyond what should be required of a preneed master trust, and appropriately, make the non-traditional master trust subject to a case-by-case approval. The test will be whether the proposed pooling arrangement has sufficient accounting procedures to protect participating operators and their consumers. Missouri is particularly sensitive to this issue in light of the NPS failure, and its procedures for trust rollovers.

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The Federal Reserve’s December 17th decision to cut its interest rate to less than a quarter of a percent is meant to encourage investors back into the stock market. But for many cemeteries, the prospect of depressed interest rates will have dire consequences to endowed/perpetual care trusts that are subject to state laws which limit or restrict equity investments.

State laws have historically imposed conservative investment standards upon endowed care funds to ensure preservation of the trust corpus. However, the bull markets experienced during the past decade often came at the expense of bond returns and other fixed income investments. With stagnant returns, cemeteries in states such as Michigan and Missouri have been seeking law changes to allow endowed care trusts to diversify for growth and larger distributions.

In 2006, a straightforward approach was introduced in the Michigan legislature. HB 6254 would have allowed an endowed care trust to distribute 50% of its accumulated net capital gains to the cemetery operator. However, that bill got lost in the turmoil of the Clayton Smart fraud. Instead, Michigan is now on the road to a more complex approach to diversification that incorporates the Prudent Investor Rule and oversight governed by rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Cemetery Commissioner.

Some of Missouri’s cemeteries introduced the unitrust concept to legislative negotiations held in 2007, and then again in Chapter 214 hearings held this past summer. That proposal would allow the cemetery operator to make an election to require the trust to make an annual fixed distribution of between 3 to 5% of the trust’s value. Missouri’s cemetery law (Chapter 214) lacks a clear definition of “income”, and regulators have taken contradictory positions over the years about whether capital gains may be treated as income to be distributed to the cemetery operator. In an attempt to clarify this ambiguity, the cemeteries turned to Missouri’s Uniform Trust Code and RSMo Section 469.411 to provide a clear standard for income, to promote diversification and to provide cemetery operators greater distributions. But in doing so, the proponents have ignored certain realities, and the controversies that surround the unitrust concept.

Many endowed care trusts are too small to effectively diversify for a fixed distribution of 5%, and proponents have fought alternatives that would grant the trustee authority to reduce distributions below 3%. The proposal would also restrict a trustee’s authority to make income and principal adjustments, a crucial element of the Missouri law.

In view of the current financial environment, cemeteries need the authority to diversify endowed/perpetual care funds. But, a balance needs to be struck between fostering growth in the trust and meeting the cemetery operator’s income needs for maintenance and care. Finding that balance should not be left to the unitrust concept, and faith in the stock market.

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Even when the need for reform is apparent to all, the legislative process can take years. With the Michigan Senate having approved a House substitute, that state’s cemeteries are a step closer to reform that could have avoided Clayton Smart’s pillaging of $70 million dollars of endowed care funds.

The Michigan Legislature’s website provides the history of SB 0674, from its introduction in August 2007, to the Senate’s December 19th vote to adopt the House substitute. Including the Attorney General’s investigation, the Michigan reform process has taken over two years. As with all reform efforts, some were not happy with the delays encountered in the Legislature’s efforts. Getting it right is not as easy as it would seem.

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Mortuary Management’s July/August Colleague Wisdom column underscores how difficult it can be to run a trade association. I can empathize with the funeral home operators who took the time to provide their thoughts. As an attorney who specializes in the death care industry, I have to weigh the costs and benefits of membership in trade associations from two industries.

Every so often, the American Bar Association calls to solicit my renewal to the ABA. I was an ABA member back in 1986, the first year out of law school. After that first year membership, I never renewed again. Yet, they continue to call. And I will continue to decline, because the ABA is not a resource that is worth the cost (to me).   

In contrast, I do belong to the Missouri Bar Association.   The MBA provides services and programs that justify its membership costs to me. The MBA is not only a good source for forms and information, it provides some reasonable discounts for continuing education classes. However, I have not found that to be same for the Kansas Bar Association. The KBA seems to be marketing primarily to the trial attorney bar (a reflection of an economic reality).

If comments published in The Colleague Wisdom are representative of the funeral industry, the article reflects that funeral directors also tend to look more to their state association for the services and programs they need. It should come as no surprise but the level of satisfaction among funeral directors varies greatly. It is difficult to compare state associations because each has its own unique set of factors or hurdles. However, there seems to be certain common standards.

The Colleague Wisdom comments provide some insight to what industry members expect from an association, and why some do not participate. The comments also touch upon the revenues that subsidize the association. As Mr. Wigger so succinctly states: membership in a state association is a matter of weighing the costs vs. the benefits. One reality is that an association must impose costs in order to have the funds needed for programs and services that will attract membership. It is also a reality that some industry members will complain no matter what the cost. 

Some of the Colleague Wisdom comments have been highlighted in yellow, green and pink. The yellow comments seem to reflect an association’s perceived values. The green comments make note of a source of revenue, and the pink comments reflect criticisms. Associations need to be sensitive to criticism, and adapt to the membership’s needs. In order to do so, the association must seek input (even if it is done so by a coded survey). 

Now for the obligatory preneed comments:

Funeral directors who are opposed to preneed will need to appreciate that master trusts are an important source of revenue for association programs and organizational expenses. The master trust is an even more important revenue source for associations in states where continuing education is not required. But as one Colleague Wisdom commentator points out, association leadership must be careful with regard to the master trust becoming a competitor to its own members. In a sense, the master trust cannot help but be a competitor to larger independents that have their own preneed administration. The master trust may be the only way for the small operator to effectively compete for the preneed sale. Accordingly, it will become incumbent for association leadership to diffuse these situations through cooperation and attempts to find mutual benefits. 

Association leadership must also be careful that the master trust does not become a source of dissatisfaction when earnings and/or expense expectations are not met. Disclosures, accountability, frequent communications, innovation and leadership will be crucial to retaining membership satisfaction. 

With the NPS failure, associations may have an opportunity to expand their master trusts. But to do so, some state associations need to assess why funeral homes turned to NPS in the first place. Some funeral homes did succumb to the promises of profit, or looked forward to the Rep visit, but many did so out of dissatisfaction with their master trust. For some funeral directors (like those in Illinois), the state association may have a difficult task in regaining the membership’s faith.

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One of the many issues facing regulators in the Clayton Smart debacle was the surrender of thousands of Forethought life insurance policies by a Forest Hill preneed trustee. New light will probably be shed on this issue with revelations that Robert Nelms and Clayton Smart may each have been using the same financial management company: Security Financial Management Company. One needs to consider whether an investment advisor looked at the insurance being held by the preneed trust and boasted ‘we can do better’.

Preneed funeral contracts are generally funded by either insurance or trusts.  Each has its advantages and disadvantages.  However, the respective advantages are generally lost when the preneed trust holds insurance products as investments.  (I will exclude cemetery preneed trusts from this discussion because cemetery merchandise is often delivered prior to the purchaser's death, thus making life insurance impractical.)

 Insurance gets the nod as the preferable funding vehicle for portability, tax consequence (to the purchaser) and consumer savings (if you're under the age of 60-something and in relatively good health).  Trust funding gets the nod for universal availability, long-term performance (if the trust has sufficient assets to permit diversified investments) and refund rights (okay, okay, put the state law variations aside for a minute).  However, each type of funding has its unique 'costs', and combining them may cost the funeral home and consumer in the long run. 

Trustees were first induced to accept insurance products in the late 1980s when annuities were purchased for trusts that could not comply with the retroactive application of Revenue Ruling 87-127.   Many of these trusts lacked the information required to report income to the purchasers.  As a grantor trust, preneed trusts could hold an annuity and have the contract's increase be deferred for tax purposes until the contract's maturity.    

Once the camel's nose was in the tent, insurance companies began to market life insurance and annuities to death care companies as solutions to lagging trust performance.  Corporate trustees often consign smaller preneed trusts to fixed income investments in a conservative approach to avoid market fluctuations. In this era of relatively low interest rates, insurance products can offer a better return than conservative bonds and government securities. And, there is the temptation of a commission on the conversion of the trust's assets to insurance. 

However, insurance products represent problems to the corporate trustee.  As demonstrated by Clayton Smart's short-sighted actions, cashing in life insurance before the purchaser's death will have a significant adverse impact on the trust's value.  Cash surrender values on 70-something year old insureds are typically low.   And if the trustee does hold the policy to maturity, how are the insurance proceeds to be taxed?  Annuities simply defer the income aspect of the contract until maturity.  Life insurance proceeds are not taxable to an individual beneficiary, but are those proceeds taxable to the trust?   More than likely, the answer is yes.  The proceeds must generally flow through the trust, thus adding time and cost to the administration. 

Funeral directors need to consider that rolling a preneed trust into insurance is probably a one-way transaction. Once it has been done, it will be a matter of a few years before an investment advisor recommends that its time to cash those policies in. Two wrongs do not make a right.   In many states, it would be difficult to justify a rollover in the first place.  Funeral directors will only compound any error made if they change their minds and cash the policies in. 

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