The monks of St. Joseph Abbey received good news in their battle to sell caskets when a Federal appeals court affirmed a lower court’s decision that struck down a Louisiana law that would have required the monks to either open a licensed funeral home or get a funeral director’s license. The District Court held that the restriction on casket sales amounted to a brand of economic protectionism that was not a legitimate state interest. The Court of Appeals applies a test that we find relevant to current controversies in Missouri and Kansas, but for this blog post we want to question whether the opinion would have been different if court had been asked to review the application of a preneed law to the preneed sale of Trappist caskets.

The purpose for preneed laws, protecting consumer payments until delivery is made, would seem to be equally applicable to funeral homes, cemeteries, casket stores, monument vendors or Trappist monks. However, most state preneed laws were written when the death care industry did not have significant competition for casket, vault and marker sales. Consequently, preneed laws are directed at death care licensees, and the occasional examiner or auditor will not be checking on the casket store to determine its compliance with the preneed law. If the casket store is making preneed sales, and marketing to out of state residents, multiple preneed laws could be implicated. The casket store’s website may reflect whether it offers deferred delivery. One of the Trappist’s websites offered the following:

Advance Arrangements

Peace of Mind for You and Your Family

Selecting a casket prior to need is a gift you can give your family. This arrangement ensures your wishes are met by securing your choice of casket for future use. By purchasing your casket in advance of need, you are relieving loved ones from making this often difficult decision, while closing your life’s story on your own terms.

Purchase at Today’s Prices Now, Ship When Needed

A pre-need arrangement with the Trappist monks of New Melleray Abbey allows you to purchase in advance, and have it shipped to the destination desired by your family at the appropriate time. You can rest assured the casket that you ordered will be available for immediate shipment when the time of need arrives.

We at Trappist Caskets feel very blessed to be able to so humbly provide these caskets, made with the work of our hands and with prayer in our hearts, to bring some small measure of comfort and solace to families in their times of need.

I hesitated to post on this issue because I love the Trappist’s ale so much, but preneed regulators need to be uniform and consistent.
 

Three years ago we asked that question with regard to the power struggle occurring between the Missouri State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors and the Missouri Division of Professional Registration staff. That post was influenced by our experiences with preneed regulators from other states, who range from elected politicians to the revolving door bureaucrat. I would always prefer the experience and stability of a Dennis Britson or a Mack Smith, but they honed their skills over decades, and Missouri is under a bit of pressure to get reform rolling. With the Missouri Legislature having vested preneed supervision with the industry, we saw hope that Missouri could establish a unique structure where the experience of the industry would mesh with a staff with long term commitments. But silly me; the regulations drafted in response to a December vote on insurance assignments provide the answer to “Who is the Boss?” It is the Governor.

I must confess that my mind drifts at times when I attend the State Board meetings. Okay, I also check emails from time to time when the Executive Director gives her reports. But, the regulation proposals leave me wondering whether I was in the wrong room last December. But, Mr. Otto did whisper to me from time to time during the meeting I thought was the State Board’s. Maybe we were at a MFDEA meeting? Then again, I recall a unanimous vote that defined the insurance assignment as a preneed contract that was to be exempt from the $36 fee.

My warning from the “Who is the Boss” post in 2010 was this:

Death care operators are often frustrated when regulators take actions that demonstrate a lack of understanding of the business (or worse yet, a misunderstanding of applicable laws). The risk to both the death care operator and consumer is when the elected preneed regulator allows politics to influence the reform process. Elected regulators may pose the greatest challenge to developing effective preneed supervision, and then maintaining that system.

It is obvious the Governor doesn’t read this blog. Since 2010, an elected politician has made insurance assignments our preneed reform priority. I get it. The excess insurance proceeds could help offset the benefits paid to nursing homes, and Chapter 208 requires a Chapter 436 preneed contract. The State doesn’t want to revisit Chapter 436. It would be easier to manipulate the language of SB1 to get the desired result. (It’s not like the industry doesn’t do it too.) It took the State Board 18 months to offer a compromise, and one that was a win-win for the state and the industry. But, you are overplaying this hand by demanding the $36 per contract fee.

For the past two years, the industry and Board members have asked what the Division really needs in terms of fees to conduct exams. The answers have been evasive at best, but I could defend that response because the examination procedures are work in progress. But, your regulation proposals indicate that “The costs for the Board to administer preneed contracts is the same per contract, regardless of the value of the preneed contract.” If that is the case, then what is the cost per contract to perform a preneed examination? I find the Division’s budget for the State Board confusing, but the numbers attached to the agenda are significant. Is the Division receiving more that it needs, and if so, where do those funds go?

Up to this point, the examination procedures have focused on recordkeeping and confirming that consumer funds were deposited to banks and insurance companies. At some later date those procedures will need to look at how those funds are administered and paid out to funeral homes. But, until then, why is the $36 fee required on a transaction where the funeral director does not receive funds until after a death has occurred?

Three years ago I defended the slow pace of the Division, and advised the industry that reform required a shared responsibility between the Division and the State Board.  Accordingly, please respect the Legislature and let the State Board perform its role for reform under SB1.
 

They say that the devil is in the details, and that is proving true for the Obama definition of the “rich” (those families that earn more than $250,000) and the plan to fix the budget. The IRS provided some detail to the Obama plan last December when it published a proposed regulation that would increase the Medicare tax to 3.8% and impose the tax on the rich through their trusts and estates. The NFDA and ICCFA have been trying to get their respective members’ attention because the proposed regulation specifically includes their business trusts as ‘rich’ that are be subject to the Medicare tax. 

Sometimes it may seem that associations cry wolf to reinforce to the membership the need for the association. But, the proposed IRS regulation is somewhat unique in that it specifically identifies Section 685 qualified funeral trusts and Section 642 endowed care trusts as those which will be subject to the Medicare Tax. As both associations point out in comments submitted to the IRS, the proposal reflects how little the Service understands the purposes of these trusts.

To see each association’s comments click the following hyperlinks:NFDA           ICCFA 

There is a legitimate risk to qualified funeral trusts that do not make individual account allocations for composite filings. We would have thought most fiduciaries prepared QFTs in such a manner, but the Service’s comments from a few years ago suggests otherwise. And, what about those preneed trusts that have not taken the Section 685 election?

Even though the Service’s rationale for application of tax to Section 642 endowed care trusts is tenuous, these trusts lack the individual accounting ‘out’ that can save the QFT.
 

If you haven’t noticed, there has been some turnover among the associations’ preneed fund managers. With the threat of additional litigation in Wisconsin, this trend could continue. But not all of the turnover has been as publicized as what we have seen in Illinois and Wisconsin. After 20 years at the helm, Merrill Lynch recently gave notice to the Michigan Funeral Directors Association of its resignation. There are no search protocols for preneed fund managers, and so Michigan borrowed from the retirement fund community by publishing a request for proposal (RFP). While the MFDA should be commended in their effort to bring transparency to their program’s asset management, they missed (or ignored) an opportunity to shift more investment responsibilities to the financial industry. Instead of using FINRA Rule 2111 (“know your client”) to their advantage, the MFDA structured the RFP to perpetuate (and extend) the funeral director’s controlling role in investment decisions.

Hidden investment charges have been ‘part of business’ in the death care industry for decades, and this author has contemplated whether ERISA’s fee disclosure requirements could ever be incorporated into preneed trusts by the Federal Trade Commission. The Michigan RFP focused on the same ERISA fee disclosure requirements, which could lead one to assume that association’s leaders did not want to make the same mistake again. The Michigan RFP also raised another ERISA concept worthy of the preneed industry’s consideration: the 401K approach to investment by individual contract. We too have wondered why larger programs have not looked at data from individual contracts and the sponsoring funeral homes to build an investment options matrix.

But, the Michigan RFP can be faulted for cutting off the diligence requirements of FINRA Rule 2111. To insulate the Association from solicitations, the RFP provided summary information about the program and required all inquiries to go through an ERISA consultant. Prospective fund managers were required to submit investment strategies on limited facts and without direct communications to the Association. It is understandable that the Association would want to narrow the field before initiating an exchange of confidential information with prospective managers, but the screening of candidates should have preceded the request for investment strategies. Subsequent to the screening, the MFDA should then have provided detailed information pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Under FINRA 2111, this sequence would have expanded the fund manager’s diligence responsibilities regarding investment strategy recommendations. The nature of the questions posed by the candidates would also have helped the MFDA in its assessment of the candidates. Instead, the RFP narrowed the fund manager’s diligence to an old investment strategy with a history of mixed results and challenges.

Within the context of ERISA retirement funds, RFPs may take a formula approach to finding a replacement fund manager. But the preneed industry is fragmented by 50 different state laws, and by program issues such as whether non-guaranteed contracts are sold, the association’s role as a seller versus an agent, investment restrictions, and trusting percentages. Injecting preneed asset management with a dose of ERISA could help to discourage hidden fees and improve the quality of fund managers, but the industry also needs an alternative to the strategy of offering funeral directors three investment options to choose from.
 

Both the Memorial Business Journal and the Funeral Service Insider commented last week on the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s February 7th article regarding the former executive director of the Wisconsin Funeral Directors Association. Several issues were raised that should be included in future industry debate, and in particular, I would agree with Mr. Isard’s questions whether association executives are qualified to manage a master trust. But the following comments beg an immediate response:

“The whole situation with [the] Wisconsin Preneed Trust went off the rails when the goal shifted from trusting funds to investing funds.”

“The assumption that these trust funds are in the investment business is a mistake. We’re not. We’re in the trust business. From my view, that is a presumption of a preservation of principle. With a trust, you have an obligation to be prudent.”

Those comments suggest that trusting funds and investing funds are somehow mutually exclusive. While the comments may reflect the views of much of the death care industry, they also reflect a failure to understand the fiduciary’s duties. When entrusted with the money of another, the fiduciary has a duty to invest those funds consistent with the purposes of the trust and the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The fiduciary’s investment duties are governed by other laws, and a majority of our states have adopted the Prudent Investor Act. Wikipedia provides the following explanation of that Act:

In enacting the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, states should have repealed legal list statutes, which specified permissible investments types. (However, guardianship and conservatorship accounts generally remain limited by specific state law.) In those states which adopted part or all of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, investments must be chosen based on their suitability for each account’s beneficiaries or, as appropriate, the customer. Although specific criteria for determining "suitability" does not exist, it is generally acknowledged, that the following items should be considered as they pertain to account beneficiaries:

• financial situation;
• current investment portfolio;
• need for income;
• tax status and bracket;
• investment objective; and
• risk tolerance.

The majority of preneed trusts involve a single seller/provider and guaranteed preneed contracts. Under such circumstances, the funeral home operator has assumed the investment risk when the preneed contract is performed as written. Fiduciaries (and fund managers) have viewed the operator as the account beneficiary for purposes of the Prudent Investor Act. But depending upon state law, and whether the contract is ‘re-written’ at the time of death, the preneed purchaser may bear the investment risk. Accordingly, the fiduciary and fund manager should not completely ignore the preneed purchaser as the account beneficiary for purposes of the Prudent Investor Act.

Neither fiduciaries nor fund managers want to bring the preneed purchaser into the Prudent Investor equation for obvious reasons. But are suitability of investments for two that dissimilar? We would suggest not if the objective is to have investment performance track the prearrangement’s purchase price increases. As we noted in a March 2010 post about the IFDA master trust, the purchaser of a non-guaranteed contract was unhappy because the return on her non-guaranteed contract (1.7%) did not keep pace with the price increases of her planned funeral (4.2%).

Determining who to include as an account beneficiary in the Prudent Investor equation only gets more complicated when the preneed trust is an association master trust with dozens, or hundreds, of funeral home operators. If the master trust includes a healthy percentage of non-guaranteed contracts, the number of account beneficiaries could swell to the thousands. If the association is not the preneed seller (as is the case in Missouri, but not Illinois), what interest does the association have in the trust so as to justify being considered an account beneficiary? There are arguments in support of the association being such a beneficiary, but can those interests ever outweigh the funeral operator and the non-guaranteed contract purchaser?

One could argue that the Wisconsin Master Trust was never fully on the rails. The Association determined early on that a depository account could not keep up with rising funeral costs. Rather than seek legislation that would clarify the trust’s investment authority, the Association leadership sought regulatory permission to allow the master trust to embark on the path of investment diversification. The program derailed only after the executive director enmeshed his personal objectives with those of the association and then conspired with the fund managers to treat the association as the master trust’s primary account beneficiary.
 

The Mississippi Secretary of State seems to be taking a very proactive approach to the regulation of preneed and perpetual care funds. Over the course of the last few years, the Regulation and Enforcement Division of the Secretary of State’s office has averaged an enforcement proceeding per month. We were curious what type of enforcement proceedings they were pursuing, and picked one at random. The luck of draw involved a situation where the Mississippi regulators alleged the preneed seller’s preneed contract form did not adequately disclose to the consumer the tax consequences of their preneed trust. While the preneed contract form stated that income taxes may be withheld by the trust, the seller’s trustee reported the income to the contract purchaser. This did not set well with the Mississippi regulators, particularly when the consumer had no right to cancel the contract and receive a refund of the trust income.

The Mississippi regulators are not alone in their perception of the inequities of this situation. Nebraska preneed regulators are also questioning why income should ever be reported to consumers when they may never receive it. The answer is that the Internal Revenue Service forced this issue with Rev. Rul. 87-127, with the goal of requiring a single method of income reporting for preneed trusts.

The Service struggled with the situation that troubles the Mississippi and Nebraska regulators: how can the purchaser be the grantor if he/she is never entitled to a refund of the income (or even trust deposits) upon the contract’s cancellation. But, as between the consumer and the funeral home, the funeral home’s right to the trust corpus is dependent upon performance of the contract. While the consumer may never receive a refund, he/she can choose a different funeral home to service the contract. The value of that service satisfies the grantor rules of the tax code, and supports the IRS’ conclusions in the Ruling.

The inequity of the situation may have led to the passage of IRC Section 685. Given an alternative is available to the seller, the Mississippi regulators sought to force the seller to either change its contract or require the trustee to change its income reporting. But in doing so, the Mississippi regulators misstate IRC Section 685. Irrevocability is not a key characteristic of an IRC Section 685 qualified funeral trust. While the Section 685 election is viewed as irrevocable, the irrevocability of the preneed contract has no impact on Section 685. The Mississippi regulators also fail to acknowledge that Section 685 is the trustee’s election to make, not the funeral home’s. While the two need to work in concert, it is the trustee that has ultimate control over the trust’s income reporting.
 

On January 14th, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon will be sworn in for his second term, and we are wondering whether the Governor’s plans for 2015 are influencing the direction of Missouri’s preneed reform. With commentary such as that published by the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the Governor may have his eyes on a 2015 campaign for national office. At a minimum, Governor Nixon could be targeting an old rival’s U.S. Senate seat. Either way, the Governor faces a nagging situation with NPS, and may feel compelled to accelerate preneed reform and deflect the criticism that has persisted for almost five years.

When National Prearranged Services collapsed in 2008, NPS funeral providers were especially critical of how then Attorney General Nixon settled the 1991 NPS lawsuit. The Attorney General’s office responded that they did the best possible with the weak enforcement powers provided by Chapter 436. Missouri’s Republican administration countered with a review committee formed for the purpose of finding industry consensus for preneed reform. But, the industry struggled to agree on key issues, and the State’s regulators took the lead in drafting Senate Bill. No. 1. In 2009, a newly elected Governor Nixon inherited the NPS fallout and a prior administration’s effort at preneed reform. Now four years later, the NPS fallout has somewhat abated (but not resolved), and there isn’t much to show in terms of preneed reform.

In contrast to the mortgage crisis or the state budget crisis, the NPS situation will not benefit from the recoveries of the nation’s economy or the financial markets. The Cassitys’ emptied the cupboards, and funeral homes are dependent upon the fixed recoveries negotiated with the state insurance guaranty fund. Most NPS providers are finding ways to cope, but one industry group persistently reminds the Governor and legislators of their discontent. The Governor would like to counter their criticism with evidence that preneed has been made safer under his watch, but it can take years to implement effective reporting and examination procedures.

As we noted in July 2011, a sudden increase in the number of financial examinations suggested that the Division was being pressured to accelerate the process. Shortly thereafter, the Division staff also began to press the State Board to define the insurance assignment as a preneed contract. The State Board and the Division staff disagreed on the insurance assignment issue, and frustration began to develop as the issue was pressed in subsequent meetings. That frustration culminated with a December 12th unanimous vote by the Board members to define insurance beneficiary designations as a preneed contract, but a preneed contract that would be exempt from the $36 preneed fee. Division staff warned that the distinction may not be legal. Within hours of the vote, the Governor’s office announced a Board appointment to replace Todd Mahn, the Chairman who had called for the vote.

The Governor’s website for Missouri’s Boards and Commissions states

"I am always looking for qualified, energetic applicants to serve on Missouri’s 200-plus boards and commissions. Please spread the word. I would greatly appreciate it if you would encourage your colleagues and friends to review the vacancies and complete an application."

While this author has disagreed with some of the positions taken by Mr. Mahn, I do not question his commitment to the industry, or to the State Board. Nor did the former Chairman lack for enthusiasm and energy while serving the Board. But, rather than replace a Board member with known health issues that was serving on an expired term, the Governor replaced the younger Chairman.

It may not have been the Governor’s intent, but the appointment could be taken as message to State Board members to ‘get with the program’. But the Governor, and the Division, risk losing the confidence of both the Board and the industry. Someone has lost sight of the first issue discussed at the 2008 legislative meetings: who should have jurisdiction over preneed. Several state agencies attended that meeting, and none expressed any interest in assuming jurisdiction over the preneed transaction. As explained in a 2009 post, financial and insurance regulators often struggle to provide effective preneed oversight because they tend to focus on the ‘backend’ of the transaction (that part of the transaction they are most familiar). The front end of the transaction can take many different forms, which can push the transaction outside the normal scope of the agency’s jurisdiction. (For example, the Nebraska Insurance Department has jurisdiction over preneed sales, which includes trust funding.) When State Board members ‘stepped up’ in 2009 to retain jurisdiction (and demonstrate that the industry could provide meaningful self regulation), a collective sigh could be heard from the Missouri Division of Finance and the Missouri Department of Insurance. The Missouri legislature signed off on State Board jurisdiction, and in doing so made a trade off: reform would rely upon the collective experiences and training of six State Board members instead of an appointed department official. Governance by a board will never be the most efficient or expedient path to action.

In SB1, the State Board was given the task of protecting consumers against another NPS by developing procedures for preneed reporting and auditing. However, the Board is dependent upon the Division of Professional Registration for staffing, legal counsel, funding and reporting administration. Together, the Board and Division crafted a mission statement for the financial examinations that was to be the cornerstone of Missouri preneed reform. From this observer’s perspective, the State Board members never understood how the insurance assignment fit in to that mission statement. Explanations given to the State Board were unpersuasive, leaving an industry to wonder whether the issue was fee driven.

It may have taken the State Board a year to reach an agreement on the insurance assignment issue, but we believe the Chairman made the right call. This issue had a greater importance to the Division than it did the State Board, and there is speculation that the $36 fee, Chapter 208 and the state budget played a factor. Regardless, a resolution was needed so that the Board and the staff could turn to more substantive reform issues, including whether SB1 provides sufficient audit powers and protections. If the Division can look no further than the funeral home’s records, would SB1 have even stopped NPS?
 

In our prior post, we commented on the lack of detail provided by the Consumer Funeral Assurance group regarding their NPS recovery plan.  We have obtained a copy of the plan, and redacted from the document correspondence that reflect names and/or contact information of recipient organizations or legislators. What is left includes a summary of the group’s proposal, which we find incoherent and difficult to understand. 

The CFA was established when NPS first collapsed and funeral providers faced an information crisis, as well as an economic crisis.  Five years later, funeral homes have a better understanding of what will be paid and when.  While no one is happy about the situation, the immediate crisis of 2008 has been eliminated.  So, today, it is not clear how many funeral homes count themselves as CFA members.  That fact is not provided by the CFA in its NPS recovery plan. 

The day may come when an NPS recovery plan is needed but the current CFA proposal detracts, rather than enhances, the group’s credibility with legislators and the industry.  Accordingly, CFA members (and former members) should request that the plan be withdrawn.    

On December 12th, a Missouri coalition of NPS preneed providers will have a second opportunity to state their case for legislation to establish a NPS recovery plan. As we noted back in September, that coalition should anticipate a tepid reception from the State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors (and much of the Missouri funeral industry). Funeral operators may be sympathetic to the harsh economic realities of the guaranty fund’s ‘fixed recovery’, but few operators perceive how those future financial losses are ‘their problem’. Legislators cannot be as dismissive because the coalition is warning that it is a matter of time before funeral homes start to fail, and when that happens, consumers will ultimately suffer the financial loss. Not knowing whether two funeral homes or twenty funeral homes are at risk, the legislature gave the coalition a hearing to present a plan. The details remain vague, but it has been reported that the plan calls for a “mandated” preneed trust. If those rumors prove accurate, the plan has two major hurdles that could block its takeoff.

In concept, a state wide, cooperative preneed trust could provide financial relief to the NPS provider. A master trust could provide participating funeral homes the economies of scale to reduce administration expenses and increase investment performance. As a collective group, the NPS providers may be able to achieve a return that not only offsets the cost increases of the future preneed business, but also some of the costs of the NPS contracts yet to be performed.

But, any thought of using investment returns of future business to fund old business would have to be closely regulated. The trust cannot take investment returns from Funeral Home A contracts and allocate them to Funeral Home B contracts. Nor can the trust take investment returns from non-guaranteed contract a001 and allocate them to NPS contract b002. With the proper administration, the investment return of Funeral Home A’s new guaranteed contracts (or old Pre-SB1 guaranteed contracts) could be split with Funeral Home A’s NPS contracts. Such a split would occur only after the proper income/expense allocations have been made to originating accounts. Under Missouri law, the consumer of one of those new accounts could chose to designate a new provider, and transfer the entire account value (including the amounts allocated to the NPS contracts) to a new trust. Consequently, the level of administration required for such allocations would be complicated. If the NPS recovery plan should seek to short cut that administration with a fixed rate of return (and using excess investment returns to fund the NPS contracts), then the plan should be rejected.

The other hurdle to takeoff is the plan obtaining the requisite trust assets for economies of scale. The rumor is that the NPS recovery plan would require all Missouri preneed sellers to participate in the trust. (If mandatory participation can be required for the Obama health plan, then it can be required for the NPS recovery plan.) Kansas regulators floated a similar idea a few years ago and quickly withdrew the suggestion after hearing the initial response from operators.
 

We previously discussed how the funeral home or cemetery assumes most of a preneed trust’s investment risk when selling a guaranteed preneed contract, and therefore should be afforded a role in the trust’s investment decisions (Fund Managers: Is Your O&E Coverage Current?). But in that same post, we were careful to point out that there are no absolutes. More funeral homes are switching to non-guaranteed preneed. And, a certain percentage of guaranteed preneed contracts are also re-written at death when the family switches funeral homes or revises the prearranged funeral (or burial) arrangement. Yet, preneed fiduciaries seem to ignore these facts when relying upon uniform trust code provisions for their authority to exchange investment powers for a hold harmless agreement.

Death care fiduciaries first need to determine whether there are any conflicts between the applicable state death care law and the broader uniform trust code. Fiduciaries in states such as Missouri and Kansas are bound by statutes which require the trustee to retain investment oversight. Such conflicts will be reconciled in favor of the more specific death care law.

If the death care law is silent on investment delegation, the applicable uniform trust code may not necessarily authorize the trustee’s exculpation from investment oversight. Some states’ trust code conditions the fiduciary’s investment exculpation upon 1) the appropriateness of the trustee’s selection of the investment advisor, and 2) upon the notice given to trust beneficiaries. Illinois’ Trusts and Trustees Act is a good example of such a requirement. But too frequently, the fiduciary views the funeral home, or cemetery, as the sole beneficiary of the death care trust for purposes of both requirements.

Assuming notice could be given to each and every preneed contract purchaser, a court would likely evaluate the sufficiency of that notice from the perspective of the elderly preneed contract beneficiary. Would the average preneed purchaser understand the implications of the investment delegation? Or, could that purchaser effectively monitor the investment decisions made pursuant to the delegation? The fiduciary’s reliance on the uniform trust code for authority for exculpation under such circumstances should be deemed unreasonable. The validity of the exculpation may also hinge on the investment advisor’s assumption of applicable death care compliance requirements. If the agency agreement does not properly incorporate a death care law’s investment restrictions (or standard), the fiduciary has not exercised ‘reasonable care, skill and caution’ in establishing the scope and terms of the delegation. Yet, I hesitate to fault the fiduciary for trying. The strategy for seeking the exculpation is often in response to the unreasonable expectations of both the industry and its regulators.

As witnessed in California, regulators often interpret archaic preneed laws so as to argue that a ‘preneed contract is the equivalent of a savings account’. Those statutes reflect the preneed transaction from a generation ago. By applying that law out of the current context, a fiction is used to establish a standard that all fiduciaries could fail. The regulator’s position seeks to make the fiduciary a guarantor of the purchaser’s deposits to trust. The reality is that every trust investment has risk, even our government’s bonds. This exposure is applicable regardless of whether the preneed contract is guaranteed or non-guaranteed.

On the other side of the table, the industry is coming to demand that the trust offset more than just the costs of performing the preneed contract. Lagging membership revenues are an issue for many state associations. The mortgage crisis hit many preneed trusts, and preneed sellers expect those losses to be recovered without additional risk. Greater trust returns are also needed to offset the cremation trend. Of course, the asset management required for higher returns comes at a greater cost to the trust.

The reality is that the industry will continue to be request better returns from the death care trust. As with other trusts, the circumstances may dictate that as expectations rise, a fiduciary may best discharge its duties by delegating the investment responsibilities to an investment advisor. As discussed in the linked law review article, the model uniform code should be used to support the delegation of investment duties. But, in contrast to the classic trust situation, the death care trust is a creature of statute, which has the consumer’s protection as its purpose. While the preneed seller may be allowed to step into the settlor’s shoes for purpose of authorizing the delegation, the seller cannot override the preneed statute by exculpating the fiduciary from investment liabilities. At a minimum, the fiduciary needs to stand ready to override investments that are unsuitable or clearly imprudent. The two largest preneed scandals involved investments which were clearly unsuitable for the death care trust. Despite what Merrill Lynch may argue, I doubt any corporate fiduciary would have found the key man insurance policy to have been suitable for investment for a preneed trust. And if R.S.Mo. Section 436.031 had been written differently, NPS’ Missouri fiduciaries would have sought more information about the insurance transactions they were directed to make.