Like the Swine Flu, a preneed virus has been spreading across the Midwest.   Looking for a cure, state legislators and regulators have been forming research teams.  It all started last summer, with Missouri’s Chapter 436 (funeral) working group and Chapter 214 (cemetery) working group.  Now, Illinois is establishing a preneed task force, and Kansas is forming a cemetery committee.  But, in contrast to the Missouri Chapter 436 working group, the forthcoming preneed research teams are limiting the industry’s involvement in the proceedings.  It’s not that the patient has a terminal condition that is contagious, but rather a reflection that organizing industry participation can be akin to herding cats.

Take the May edition of the American Funeral Director as an example. There are no less than six articles addressing preneed. As Mr. Creedy points out, everyone in the industry has an opinion and some can’t help but apply a general prescription for the preneed transaction. But, preneed is governed by more than 50 different state laws, making the transaction impervious to such generalizations. Boiling the issues down for the sake of an editor’s guidelines only contributes to the confusion of our industry members. While these types of articles often quote experts with opposing (and often, valid) opinions, death care operators tend to remember only the opinions that support their preneed program (or, supports their opposition to another form of preneed).

The preneed problem involves complex issues that require an in-depth analysis by our respective state legislators and regulators. For the sake of our consumers, we need to provide legislators and regulators objective and unbiased information about all aspects of preneed.

This patient is very ill, but not terminal. There are no easy cures or solutions.

Missouri’s preneed reform legislation will be amended on the House floor in the next day or so, and some of the Representatives have heard that old phrase about legislating morality. There is some truth to that phrase, and to some of the other objections raised against the reform legislation.

Preneed oversight will impose a substantial financial burden on a strapped state government and regulators lack the requisite experience to define the future course of preneed. However, these objections seem to wither when read in conjunction with the ‘excuses’ of the IFDA member funeral homes.

In a nutshell, Illinois funeral directors did not perform due diligence with regard to the management of their master trust. Instead, funeral directors placed their trust in their elected leadership, who then placed their trust in an investment advisor.

For those of us who work in this industry there is one given fact: funeral directors are caregivers by nature, and would rather spend their time with a family than the preneed trust’s accountant, attorney and investment manager. Well respected industry leaders are calling the current preneed situation “nuts”, and recommend that funeral directors focus on what they do best: serve the family. This advice resonates with most funeral directors, but they also know that families have come to expect the preneed option. But if preneed is to be offered, funeral directors must begin doing their homework.

Two years ago, Sue Simon wrote about Missouri’s triple-dipping trusts. One might have thought NPS’ demise brought this issue to an end, but that is not the case. A program utilizing a variable annuity product is being marketed to Missouri funeral directors. The promises made with regard to this product seem familiar to those made to the IFDA.

Depending on the final version of Missouri’s preneed reform legislation, funeral directors and fiduciaries may be forced to explain the condition of their preneed trusts. It would be best to put the Illinois Secretary of State’s questions to the investment advisor before the investment is made, rather than after.

Many preneed trusts either experienced significant capital losses last year or are sitting on assets that have unrealized losses. For those trusts that have taken a Section 685 election, these losses may be carried into future years as a capital loss carryover. While everyone would prefer to avoid realizing those losses, that loss can be used to offset future trust income. With the proper individual contract accounting, the loss could be extended for a longer period than the aggregate reporting followed by many trustees. For an explanation of Section 685 and the differences between aggregate reporting and composite reporting see our August 9, 2008 post titled “The Section 685 QFT amendment: Supporting Soldiers’ Survivors”.

As new allegations surface about the Merrill Lynch broker associated with the IFDA master trust, some may appropriately ask why a preneed trust would ever invest in an insurance product. There was a time when the twain shall never meet. That all changed in January 1988, and specifically when the IRS and Treasury decided to apply Rev. Rul. 87-127 retroactively to states ‘that should have known’ the funeral home/grantor method of income reporting was inappropriate.

Prior to the ruling, preneed trustees were taking different approaches to reporting the income earned by the trust. With regard to states such as California and Illinois, the trust was required to accrue income and the Service believed trusts from those states lacked authority for electing the grantor method with the preneed seller as grantor.

Consequently, the Service leveled the boom by serving notice that the ruling would be applied retroactively in certain states. This posed a genuine problem for existing trusts because most lacked the requisite consumer information to report income in compliance with the ruling. Thus started a mad scramble to find an alternative to income reporting, and thus began the exodus to insurance.

Today, preneed trustees can avoid the burden of Rev. Rul. 87-127 by electing taxation pursuant to IRC Section 685. While a few legitimate reasons for preneed trusts to hold an insurance product remain, the insurance transaction merits close scrutiny, particularly when a conversion of existing assets to insurance is involved (NPS and its Missouri trusts).

The preneed trustee should ask certain fundamental questions of those who seek to have the trust invest in insurance:

· How will this product be taxed upon maturity?
· Does this product provide the requisite liquidity to fund cancellations?
· Is a commission paid, and to whom?
· How strong is the policy’s issuer?
 

To the extent a life insurance policy is utilized, the decision invariably becomes an irrevocable election. The policy’s cash value generally precludes getting back out.

Generally, annuities provide a more flexible alternative to life insurance, but pitfalls still exist. In recent years, funeral directors have received solicitations to have their preneed trusts invest in a group, variable annuity product. Trustees still need to ask these fundamental questions, particularly when an investment broker is advising the funeral director.

With regard to the taxation of the insurance product, few seem to realize that the trust is dependent upon Rev. Rul. 87-127 for the desired tax consequence.

For those interested in the history of Rev. Rul. 87-127, and its alternative reporting method (Section 685), Professor Joel Newman provided a fair and accurate account in 80 Tax Notes 711.

With a recent editorial opinion, the State Journal-Register seeks to keep U.S. Senator Roland Burris accountable for his role in the IFDA master trust problems by asking the following questions:

· As comptroller, why did he think it was a good idea to allow the IFDA control of the fund?
· How did he monitor the group?
· Did he ask questions about its administration?
· Did he know that it would be backed by life insurance policies on IFDA leaders and members?
· When he became a lobbyist for the IFDA in 2007, what solutions did he envision?

But in the effort to build a fire under the Senator’s feet, the paper may have innocently misstated the facts.

What little that has been released about the master trust’s current state does not suggest that its value has dwindled down to $59 million dollars. While the fund has undoubtedly lost value, some of the ‘write down’ numbers attributed to the master trust represent an accounting change in what is to be paid funeral homes.

However, this should not detract from the paper’s effort to hold Mr. Burris accountable for his role in the IFDA’s problems.

While the settlement negotiated with the National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations (“NOLHGA”) provides funding for the vast majority of NPS preneed contracts, there could be as many as 7,500 NPS preneed contracts that fall outside this coverage. For one of a couple of reasons, NPS never purchased an insurance policy for these preneed contracts. These are the NPS “orphan contracts” that regulators and the NPS Special Deputy must figure out what to do with.

NPS and its sister insurance companies were put into receivership by the Texas Department of Insurance. The special deputy receiver appointed to administer the NPS assets and liabilities negotiated coverage with the National Organization of Life and Health Guaranty Associations (NOLHGA). However, this coverage is dependent upon a policy (or sufficient evidence of the intent to purchase a policy) having been issued for the consumer’s preneed contract. In the absence of a policy, the guaranty association will not honor a claim, and the consumer will be forced to make a claim with the special deputy receiver.

The orphan contract is primarily a Missouri problem because NPS sold insurance funded preneed contracts in most states. For Missouri, NPS sold trust-funded contracts, or rolled a funeral home’s trust into a NPS trust (that subsequently purchased insurance). With regard to Missouri installment contracts, NPS apparently instructed the trustee to defer the insurance purchase until the contract was paid in full. Consequently, the consumers who are making payments on one of NPS’ Missouri contracts may have an orphaned contract.

The Missouri Insurance Guaranty Association is working with funeral homes to identify those NPS preneed contracts that are orphaned. Missouri consumers who are making installment payments on a NPS contract should contact their funeral director for assistance in determining whether their contract is orphaned or not.

With regard to these Missouri consumers, the Special Deputy Receiver and regulators need to consider that it was their recommendation that all consumers continue to pay on their NPS contracts in order to maintain coverage.

U.S. Senator Roland Burris has been sidestepping questions about his role(s) in the IFDA master trust troubles.  While the Senator was a side issue to a March 30th article published by the Springfield Journal Register, the statement provided by his public-relations specialist may signal just how little Mr. Burris understood about his responsibilities to the Illinois public.

In an effort to shift blame to current Comptroller Dan Hynes, Delmarie Cobb wrote to the paper:

I don’t know what he has to say is relevant given that he left the comptroller’s office in 1991. When he left, the pre-need fund was in the black.

Au contraire, Ms. Cobb.

The $49+ million dollar question is why Comptroller Burris issued a seller’s license to the IFDA when it did not have a corporate fiduciary?

Officially, its called House Committee Substitute for Senate Substitute for Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1.   Some of the ‘unofficial’ titles given this bill are not fit for publication.

It doesn’t matter who you talk to about Missouri’s current preneed reform bill, everyone has a complaint.  Even the consumer advocates.  Under normal circumstances, this general mood of discontent would ensure the defeat of a legislative proposal.  But these are not normal times, and it is appropriate that the Columbia Daily Tribune would remind the state of that fact by speaking with former Senator Jerry Howard.

In the early 1990’s, Senator Howard took on the problems of Chapter 436 and Chapter 214. While Senator Howard had success in addressing Missouri’s perpetual care law, Chapter 436 reform proved a greater hurdle.  More than a dozen years ago, representatives from the funeral and cemetery industries met with regulators to draft revisions to Chapter 436.  Although National Prearranged Service representatives attended those meetings, and provided tacit approval of the draft amendments, NPS had its own lobbying agenda.

Senator Howard took those amendment proposals to legislature, but could not obtain the necessary support of his fellow legislators.  Key legislators had been prepped for the proposals’ weaknesses.

HCS SS SCS SB1 has some flaws that need to be worked out, but time is running out for the current legislative session.  If the choice comes down to this bill or no bill, this bill should be passed with an understanding that its flaws need to be addressed by regulations and technical corrections in the next legislative session.

The IFDA seems to be everyone’s favorite whipping boy. Even prominent industry leaders are stepping back from the Association in its time of need. The epicenter for the latest news on the IFDA’s troubles has been the Springfield Journal-Register and Bruce Rushton. Mr. Rushton has done a thorough and excellent job of reporting on the IFDA master trust. In support of that reporting, the Journal-Register published an editorial calling for action to protect Illinois consumers. In response, Springfield funeral director Chris Butler wrote to the Journal-Register to present a different perspective of the reporting and editorial. I, for one, agree with Mr. Butler that the Journal-Register is contributing to the confusion and anxieties of consumers who hold a preneed contract.

References to the IFDA master trust as a Ponzi scheme have been abused. It’s a fact that the IFDA made promises to its membership that it has not been able to keep. In a very literal sense, this may seem to fit the Ponzi scheme definition, but the IFDA master trust does not begin to equate to the Bernie Madoff fraud, or even the NPS business model. Certain factors have contributed to a liquidity problem for the master trust. The single greatest factor, the collapse of the financial markets, is completely beyond the IFDA’s control. Rather than sell off assets at a loss, fiduciaries in this situation would prefer to use incoming funds to meet liquidity needs. This is not the classic Ponzi scheme.

As Mr. Butler suggests, it is the Illinois funeral director who will bear most of the financial consequences of the master trust deficits. While there is a legitimate exposure to the consumers holding non-guaranteed contracts, the IFDA must be afforded the opportunity to do right by these consumers. Contrary to what the Journal-Register suggests, state law does not appear to ensure these consumers ‘can’t lose money on their investment’. In reality, the non-guaranteed contract purchaser has investment risk because of the decision to forego the guaranteed contract.  Granted, the consumer may not have been able to afford the guaranteed contract (and its required installment payments).  But, the non-guaranteed contract represents a fund set aside for use at a future date (without promises from the funeral home about what those funds will purchase). 

When a funeral home steps forward to honor a non-guaranteed contract regardless of the deficit, the consumer should recognize that the funeral director is covering the deficit out of a commitment to the family, and not because of a state law.   Consumers of guaranteed contracts should also appreciate that funeral homes are honoring those contracts despite legitimate controversies over their obligation to do so. 

The IFDA and its advisors made serious mistakes, but so did the regulators. Oversight fell through the cracks several years ago. Restructuring the master trust and its oversight could take years. The reform process will only take longer if misplaced criticism must be addressed at every step.

In naming the IFDA officers and board of directors as individual defendants in their lawsuit, the Calvert group sought to make these individuals accountable for management of the association’s master trust.  Members of a board of directors have a duty to act in the best interests of the organization.  Defenses against personal liability are afforded the board member so long as he/she has acted reasonably, diligently and in good faith, even when the organization suffers a catastrophic loss as a result of the board’s decisions.  However, what defenses were afforded the IFDA board members are now compromised by the lawsuit filed by the Association’s liability carrier, and the outcome could have a chilling effect on new board members’ efforts to do the right thing.

Funeral Service Insider and Chicago Tribune have reported a limited number of facts, but the liability carrier seems to be challenging coverage of the IFDA for the Association’s failure to provide timely notice of “the claim”. Federal Insurance Company cites the June 21, 2006 letter from the Illinois Comptroller’s office as the event that gave rise to the claim.

The IFDA has valid issues to raise in opposition to the carrier’s assertions, but litigation moves slowly.  In the meantime, prospective candidates to the IFDA board of directors must weigh their personal exposure to this situation.  Doing the right thing may not be enough for some who have been injured by the master trust’s decline in value.

Other state associations should take from this latest IFDA development the need to review their liability insurance policies and to timely report all potential claims.